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“‘Thee it behoves to take another road.’”
(Virgil to Dante)
The Divine Comedy, Inferno, Canto I1
I. INTRODUCTION
It has sadly become trite to observe that we live in a post-truth
society.2 The hallmark of a post-truth society is its reliance upon
alternative facts.3 Such alternative facts are no longer grounded in
empirical evidence or governed by the basic laws of logic.4 Instead,
1. DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY 9 (Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, trans.,
Barnes & Nobles Inc., 2016). This article is about the value of stepping off a seemingly
direct path and finding a different way to one’s goal that is premised in a broader quest for
understanding. The conversation between Dante and Virgil is one such stepping off—
Dante found his way barred and looked for a guide to take another road. This road is
allegorical in the Divine Comedy. But importantly for this article, it is also programmatic
for the act of writing the poem: Dante translates Virgil, Latin to Italian, epic hexameter to
terza rima, and the adoration of Venus and Caesar to a Christian context. Longfellow in
turn translates Dante—Italian into English, European high middle ages to American
romanticism and classicism to an opening to modern literatures. Our understanding of
truth and identity, and our exercise of judgment changes when we take that different road.
And in taking it, more often than not, translation is a key map to keep us from getting lost
in the woods.
2. See S.I. Strong, Alternative Facts and the Post-Truth Society: Meeting the Challenge,
165 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 137, 137-38 (2017) (discussing the post-truth problem).
3. Id.
4. Compare Trump Holds Firm for Kavanaugh but Calls Accuser Credible, ASSOC. PRESS
(Sept.
28,
2018),
https://apnews.com/2650e44f2a73484da4c29ca4343dc6f5
[https://perma.cc/22M5-NCZS] (President Trump finding testimony by a woman accusing
Brett Kavanaugh of sexual assault “very compelling”), with Peter Baker, Trump Bets
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commentators submit that public discourse today is dominated by
those who peddle in narrative with callous disregard for the truth.5
Lawyers frequently assert that the rule of law is a potent
antidote against such an attitude to the truth.6 The rule of law was
thought of as a check against tin-pot dictators and authoritarian
rule after the fall of the Soviet Union.7 The link is certainly
cemented deeply enough within our collective subconscious
through the clockwork repetition of images of young dashing
lawyers (frequently played by Tom Cruise) extracting a truth we
supposedly cannot handle from mendacious authority figures in
the name of law and justice.8
The problem is that—on the world stage at least—this
assertion may be a myth. If one were to ask an international judge
how she would get to the truth or examine the evidence, she would
tell us “I am guided by my intimate conviction.”9 While her intimate
conviction might differ from that of, say, President Vladimir Putin
of Russia or Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina with regard
to a specific brewing international incident, she could not in fact
Kavanaugh ‘Hoax’ Turns into Midterm Gains, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/us/politics/trump-kavanaugh-accusationshoax.html [https://perma.cc/3UNY-STGP] (President Trump asserting the same
accusation is “‘a hoax’ and ‘fabricated.’”).
5. See Quinta Jurecic, On Bullshit and the Oath of Office: The “LOL Nothing Matters”
Presidency, LAWFARE (Nov. 23, 2016, 11:28 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/bullshitand-oath-office-lol-nothing-matters-presidency [https://perma.cc/B5QU-P8AS]; Roger
Cohen, Donald Trump Just Cannot Help It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/11/opinion/donald-trump-illegal-immigrationborder-wall.html [https://perma.cc/8YF9-F3XQ]; HARRY G. FRANKFURT, ON BULLSHIT
passim (2005).
6. See Thomas Burri, Regulating the Risk of Trumpism, 8 EUR. J. RISK REG. 64, 64-65
(2017) (“New ways need to be found to fortify the rule of law against lies, hatred, and
violence which, in a post-truth age, spread unfiltered”); but see David S. Rubenstein, Taking
Care of the Rule of Law, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 168, 205 (2018) (“Especially in a ‘post-truth’
era, where perceptions dominate over facts, rule of law arguments that turn on contestable
facts and framings will never convince non-believers.”).
7. John K. M. Ohnesorge, Developing Development Theory: Law and Development
Orthodoxies and the Northeast Asian Experience, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 219, 247-48
(2007).
8. A FEW GOOD MEN (Castle Rock Entertainment 1992) (Kaffee: “I WANT THE
TRUTH!” Jessup: “YOU CAN’T HANDLE THE TRUTH!”); see also THE FIRM (Davis
Entertainment, Mirage Enterprises 1993) (“It’s not sexy, but it’s got teeth! Ten thousand
dollars and five years in prison. That’s ten and five for each act. Have you really looked at
that?”).
9. See PHILIPPA WEBB, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION 189
(2013) (discussing the use of the intimate conviction standard in international law).
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tell either of them how she approached the evidence differently
from both men in advancing their respective political claims.10 All
she could have told us is to trust her (and, perhaps, not them).
This blind spot is deeply problematic. As this Article submits,
the rule of law on the world stage is at risk of being guided by
narrative as much as the post-truth populism against which it is
invoked. Post-truth populists use narratives to anchor seemingly
empirical statements (“largest crowd ever”) in a group’s own
mythologies of self-worth (“we are the moral majority”).11 In the
legal context, narratives are similarly omni-present. Narratives in
the legal context guide factfinding through the central use of
presumptions. These presumptions come to be used when there is
inconclusive evidence to determine what took place. Centrally,
decisionmakers in those instances look at the record through the
lens of a presumption that actors conduct themselves in good
faith.12 They acted as they ought to have acted. This approach
dangerously short circuits the fact-finding process.
In more concrete terms, Professors Oona Hathaway and Scott
Shapiro have studied an exhaustive historical record of pre-1928
war manifestos.13 They explain that “[b]y making the reasons for
war manifest, manifestos sought to make clear that the war in
question was just.”14 A just war, in turn, was waged on permissible
legal grounds, meaning that the manifestos referred to serious

10. Julia Ioffe, What Putin Really Wants, ATLANTIC (Feb. 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/01/putins-game/546548/
[https://perma.cc/2W72-6WAZ] (“Putin and Lavrov were known within the Obama
administration for their long tirades, chastising the American president for all the
disrespect shown to Russia since 1991”); Michael D. Shear, Furious Lindsey Graham Calls
Kavanaugh Hearing ‘the Most Unethical Sham’, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/27/us/politics/lindsey-graham-kavanaughhearing.html [https://perma.cc/SHL4-22YP].
11. Eric Bradner, Conway: Trump White House Offered ‘Alternative Facts’ on Crowd
Size, CNN (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/22/politics/kellyanneconway-alternative-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/LDH2-MHUC]; Alternative Facts'
Remark Tops 2017 List of Notable Quotes, FOXNEWS.COM (Dec. 12, 2017),
https://www.foxnews.com/us/alternative-facts-remark-tops-2017-list-of-notablequotes [https://perma.cc/82Z2-SUBZ].
12. BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 305 (2006).
13. OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS, HOW A RADICAL PLAN
TO OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE WORLD 31-81 (2017).
14. Id. at 40.
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grievances that sounded in the then-existing international law.15
Applying the presumptions developed in international law that
parties act honesty and reasonably, it would follow that no state
ever invaded another purely for reasons of conquest. This
conclusion is facially naïve. In fact, Hathaway and Shapiro have
debunked it as historically inaccurate.16 The very fact-finding
process underlying a rule of law approach to conflict resolution
thus would be dangerously blind to the actual facts and construct
a reality out of its own, narrative-based “alternative” facts.
This Article argues that this state of affairs requires us
fundamentally to re-think how factfinding processes must work. It
argues that existing global factfinding processes can be redeemed
if they do not assume that facts can be constructed out of a single
narrative. Instead, it submits that factfinding must actively
translate between narratives of the parties affected by the dispute.
This reconstruction of the factfinding process relies upon the
principle of good faith. This principle requires, in broad contours,
that parties act with other regard. This Article applies this principle
to the factfinding process itself by requiring that facts are
established with other regard, that is with due respect to the
respective narratives through which the parties encounter the
dispute.
This approach allows factfinding premised in the rule of law
to make sense of factual claims even when they cannot be
empirically tested. It focuses not on what was. Such a focus would
be unlikely ever to become testable and as such leads to proof by
narrative alone. Rather, it focuses on communicative effects. It can
create a context in which conduct is meaningful because of the
interaction between the narratives of the affected parties, and thus
tests narratives against each other and finds the truth in this
interplay between narratives.
Again, in the context of examining the causes of war, this is
what diligent historians do when they examine the stated causes
for armed conflict. Professor Christopher Clark’s explanation of
how (rather than why) World War I came about is a masterful
display of such research: he notes, consistent with the approach of
15. Id.
16. See id. at 42, 97 (noting that manifestos “matter precisely because they are
propaganda” and that “Hugo Grotius was not the great apostle of peace. He was the great
apologist for war.”).
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looking to communicative effects, that “the focus on how suggests
an alternative approach: a journey through the events that is not
driven by the need to draw up a charge sheet against this or that
state or individual, but aims to identify decisions that brought war
about and to understand the reasoning or emotions behind
them.”17 He goes on that this “does not mean excluding questions
of responsibility entirely from the discussion—the aim is rather to
let the why answers grow, as it were, out of the how answers rather
than the other way around.”18 It is thus focus on the between—the
interaction of decisions in light of what was known to each of the
players when the decision was made and the real time knock on
effect of each decision. Another historical masterpiece using a
similar approach is David Herbert Donald’s biography of Abraham
Lincoln, which seeks to explain to us the basis for his decisions as
they were made rather than fall prey to hindsight bias.19
As this Article will show, this new approach is fundamentally
consistent with best practices in the international jurisprudence. It
does, however, permit a more nuanced legal critique of decisions
that should be intuitively problematic. It thus advances the
understanding of how international law fact-finding can live up to
its rule of law aspirations and provides a new doctrinal toolkit to
improve the quality of justice before international courts and
tribunals.
More broadly, this Article shows how the rule of law can in
fact become instrumental in engagement in a post-truth society. It
creates a means of engagement with others even when parties rely
predominantly on narratives. It therefore showcases how the rule
of law is not an antagonist to populist rhetoric. Rather, it shows
how the application of the rule of law in fact can overcome the
challenges of participating in a post-truth discourse. The rule of
law, in other words, can continue to live up to its lofty promise and
aspirations. To do so, the rule of law must however, become more
yielding and listen rather than engaging in the traditional trope of
a Tom Cruise-lookalike shouting at authority at the top of his lungs.
This Article is organized in five parts. Part I introduces the
apparent methodological sloppiness of international judges and
17. CHRISTOPHER CLARK, THE SLEEPWALKERS: HOW EUROPE WENT TO WAR IN 1914 xxviii
(2012) (emphasis in original).
18. Id. (emphasis in original).
19. DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 13 (1995).
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arbitrators in their engagement with record facts. Part II will then
explain that this apparent methodological sloppiness, thankfully, is
only skin deep. International courts and tribunals do have set
means by which they scrutinize evidence. This means of analyzing
and testing evidence is anchored in burdens of proof and standards
of proof. These burdens and standards of proof, in turn, are
influenced by the presumptions; courts use these presumptions in
attempts to do material justice rather than mechanizing claim
resolutions.
Part III then sets out the doctrinal rules governing the use of
presumptions and inferences proper. It explains how
presumptions and inferences come to be used in the complete
record context and thus underlines again the vital role
presumptions play in international justice. Part IV explains the
problem encountered by presumptions due to their grounding in
the principle of good faith. Part IV explains that the current use of
good faith runs into an is-ought problem and becomes reliant upon
narrative as a tool of dispute resolution that it is no longer able to
test by empirical means. Part V concludes with a normative
proposal how to improve the link between truth and
(international) rule of law. This proposal is to take seriously the
grounding of presumptions in doctrines of good faith as other
regard, and explain how this grounding is doctrinally defensible
and helps in overcoming the narrative problem created by the
necessary reliance upon presumptions in a rule of law based
factfinding paradigm.
II. A PRIMA FACIE LACK OF FACTUAL RIGOR
Rule of law has long been held out as an antidote to
authoritarian rule. As part of the Washington consensus, the rule
of law was thought to hem in the margin of maneuver for dictators
and populist leaders.20 Significantly, the rule of law was also
thought of a means to confront and debunk authoritarian
propaganda and return decision-making and international public
discourse to a rational engagement of facts.21
Despite its importance as an antidote to propaganda, rule of
law advocates have reasonably neglected to explain how this goal
20. Burri, supra note 6, at 64-65.
21. Ohnesorge, supra note 7, at 247-48.
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should be achieved. The closest set of rules to the broader problem
we experience is the law of evidence, that is the law governing how
those applying the rule of law themselves gather facts. But the law
of evidence remains a doctrinally under-developed field.
Consequently, the treatment of evidentiary issues in international
decisions, as well as in scholarship discussing these decisions
frequently lacks apparent rigor.
One such example of a facial lack of evidentiary rigor is the
Pulp Mills case between Argentina and Uruguay.22 Argentina
alleged that Uruguay had acted in violation of the 1975 Statute of
the River Uruguay by building pulp mills on its shores, thereby
impermissibly affecting the river’s water quality.23 The Court held
that Uruguay had breached its procedural obligations to consult
but had not breached its substantive obligations under the 1975
Statute.24 Specifically, Uruguay had failed to pass on appropriate
environmental impact assessments as required by the treaty.25
Uruguay had not however violated its obligations not to pollute or
change the ecological balance of the river.26
As lawyers are not environmental scientists versed in river
ecosystems, the Court required the aide of expertise.27 The parties
did not however provide the relevant expertise directly.28 Rather,
they hired consultants to appear as co-counsel. By doing so, they
shielded the consultants from being examined by the Court or
opposing counsel.29
Understandably, the Court was frustrated with this strategic
choice as it complicated its fact-finding mission and let the parties
know as much in its judgment.30 Nevertheless, the Court pressed
on. The Court explained that it “does not find it necessary in order
to adjudicate the present case to enter into a general discussion on
the relative merits, reliability and authority of the documents and

22. Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Urug.), Judgment, 2010
I.C.J. 14 (Apr. 20) [hereinafter Pulp Mills].
23. Id. at 25.
24. Id. at 106.
25. Id. at 60.
26. Id. at 86.
27. Id. at 72.
28. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J at 72.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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studies prepared by the experts and consultants of the Parties.”31
What is more, the Court noted (again with a hint of annoyance) that
“despite the volume and complexity of the factual information
submitted to it,” it would continue with its mission.32 It explained
“in keeping with its practice, the Court will make its own
determination of the facts, on the basis of the evidence presented
to it, and then it will apply the relevant rules of international law
to those facts which it has found to have existed.”33
While one can certainly feel the Court’s pain oozing through
these passages, a common law trained lawyer would balk at this
manner of discussing evidence. How can a case be decided on the
merits that by all accounts requires expert evidence without
passing “on the relative merits, reliability and authority of the
documents and studies prepared by the experts and consultants of
the Parties?”34 How exactly can the Court make “its own
determination of facts” without such comments? It would seem to
be beyond the Court’s ability (or any lawyer’s ability for that
matter) to pass judgment on the impact of discharges on Uruguay
water qualities without expert evidence.35 This, however, is
precisely what the Court appears to imply it is able to do.
The discussion of evidentiary standards in Pulp Mills
showcases the overall problem well. The Court is aware of an
underlying deficiency in the manner in which a case was brought
to it for decision.36 Rather than engage the morass of a record
created by the parties head on, however, the Court seeks to elevate
itself above the fray;37 One could perhaps picture an imaginary
motto hanging in chambers in the Hague—“When they go low, we
go high.”38 It then seeks to resolve by clean legal analysis what the
parties left unresolved through careful factual proof.39
Problematically, however, this exercise stands to succeed only if
31. Id.
32. Id. at 72.
33. Id.
34. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 73.
35. Id. at 91-99.
36. Id. at 72-73.
37. Id.
38. Quotes from Hillary Clinton’s Convention, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/31/opinion/sunday/quotes-from-hillary-clintonsconvention.html?searchResultPosition=10 [https://perma.cc/Q6TR-XHLY].
39. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 91-99.
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the Court is able to make sense of what the parties, to its mind,
strategically sought to obfuscate. Unless the Court can bring legal
tools to bear to sort out the evidentiary mess, it would seem that it
could only make a bad decision.
The Court is sadly no exception when it comes to the
underdevelopment of the treatment of evidence. International
arbitration commentators noted that the only rule of evidence in
international arbitration was the discretion of the arbitrator.40
These commentators in fact credit the practice before the
International Court of Justice as instructive on questions of
evidence before international arbitral tribunals.41 Such comments
would invite reasonably similar types of decisions in international
arbitration, as well.
This potential conclusion is deeply problematic. Any legal
analysis is only as solid as the factual foundation upon which it is
built. Moreover, factual findings frequently drive the result in
international arbitrations or adjudications.42 This would suggest
that international dispute resolution has a potentially serious
foundation problem as well as a serious legitimacy problem.
This problem becomes more pronounced when we look to
international law fact-finding as an antidote to the post-truth
syndrome in current political discourse. The problem with the
post-truth syndrome is that there are no hallmarks for how one
should anchor discourse in some form of discernible reality.43
Rather, it is possible for discourse participants to disappear into
narratives without much risk to be brought back to earth by means
of fact checking.44 The discussion so far has shown that
international justice has work to do in order to fare much better—
or provide the tools by which the rule of law could address the
post-truth syndrome more broadly. So far, there does not appear
to be a clear matrix according to which the rule of law could reign
in the post-truth syndrome. All it can offer so far is the advice to

40. CHRISTOPH SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 641-45 (2d ed.
2009).
41. Id.
42. Stanimir Alexandrov, Remarks, in 2 INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 195, 205 (Ian Laird & Todd Weiler eds., 2009).
43. Strong, supra note 2, at 145.
44. Id.
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trust the discretion of appointed decision-makers. In the current
political context, such a request is reasonably naïve.
II. Burdens and Standards of Proof
The starting point for any account how the international rule
of law approaches fact-finding is to understand the role played by
burdens and standards of proof in international justice. The
concepts of burdens and standards of proof are the first principles
that allow for an orderly decision-making process in contested
cases. They both rest on the insight that there is a difference
between allegation and proof—and that the person doing the
alleging is also the person who should do the proving. This Part
outlines how that particular insight operates in international
justice. The key insight it offers is that burdens of proof and
standards of proof are not the sterile, blindly operated scales of
courthouse art. Rather, burdens and standards of proof are
tethered to evidentiary presumptions, which implicitly embed a
narrative about the world within the very operation of
international justice.
A.

Burden of Proof

1. The Basic Rule in Action
The International Court of Justice is a foundational source for
key concepts of burdens of proof in international justice. Our Pulp
Mills test case reveals the extent to which the Court tends to rely
on burdens of proof to resolve disputes.45 As already discussed
above, the Pulp Mills case involved reasonably complicated
scientific questions which were left unaddressed by competent
expert testimony and cross-examination.46 The Court therefore
appeared to suggest that it would make its own evidentiary
findings without going into a detailed examination of the expert
submissions.47
A careful analysis of the relevant substantive sections of the
Pulp Mills decision leads to a deeply surprising result: the Court did
not ultimately end up making factual findings despite its facial
promise to do so on the face of the judgment. Argentina advanced
45. Pulp Mills, Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, 14-15 (Apr. 20).
46. Id. at 72-73.
47. Id.
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as its core submissions that Uruguay had failed to (1) contribute to
the optimum rational utilization of the river; (2) ensure that the
management of the soil and woodlands would not impair the
quality of river waters; (3) to coordinate measures to avoid
changes in the ecological balance; and (4) to prevent pollution and
preserve the aquatic environment by discharging (a) dissolved
oxygen, (b) phosphorus, (c) phenolic substances, (d) nonylphenols,
(e) dioxins and furans, as well as (f) negatively affecting
biodiversity.48 The Court addressed these submissions in turn.49
The Court joined the first submission advanced by Argentina
on optimum rational utilization of the river to its substantive
analysis of the specific pollution claims advanced by Argentina.50
The Court rejected Argentina’s second submission concerning the
management of the soil and woodlands because “Argentina has not
provided any evidence to support its contention.”51 It similarly
concluded with regard to Argentina’s third contention, i.e.,
Uruguay had failed to coordinate measures to avoid changes in the
ecological balance, that “Argentina has not convincingly
demonstrated that Uruguay has refused to engage in such coordination as envisaged by Article 36, in breach of that
provision.”52 The Court adopted a similar method to address the
specific pollution claims raised by Argentina. It ruled as follows
with regard to Argentina’s specific claims:
 Dissolved oxygen claim: “the Court finds that the allegation made by Argentina
remains unproven.”53
 Phosphorous claim: “The Court finds that based on the evidence before it, the
Orion (Botnia) mill has so far complied with the standard for total phosphorus
in effluent discharge.”54

48. Id. at 14-55.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 74 (“Of particular relevance in the present case are its functions relating to
rule-making in respect of conservation and preservation of living resources, the
prevention of pollution and its monitoring, and the co-ordination of actions of the Parties.
These functions will be examined by the Court in its analysis of the positions of the Parties
with respect to the interpretation and application of Articles 36 and 41 of the 1975
Statute.”).
51. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 75.
52. Id. at 77.
53. Id. at 93.
54. Id. at 95.
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 Phenolic substances claim: “[b]ased on the record, and the data presented by
the Parties, the Court concludes that there is insufficient evidence to attribute
the alleged increase in the level of concentrations of phenolic substances in the
river to the operations of the Orion (Botnia) mill.”55
 Nonylphenols claim: “Argentina has not however, in the view of the Court,
adduced clear evidence which establishes a link between the nonylphenols
found in the waters of the river and the Orion (Botnia) mill. [. . . . ] The Court
therefore concludes that the evidence in the record does not substantiate the
claims made by Argentina on this matter.”56
 Dioxins and furans claim: “The Court considers that there is no clear evidence
to link the increase in the presence of dioxins and furans in the river to the
operation of the Orion (Botnia) mill.”57
 Biodiversity claim: “The Court has not, however, found sufficient evidence to
conclude that Uruguay breached its obligation to preserve the aquatic
environment including the protection of its fauna and flora.”58 And “[t]he
record rather shows that a clear relationship has not been established between
the discharges from the Orion (Botnia) mill and the malformations of rotifers,
or the dioxin found in the sá balo fish or the loss of fat by clams reported in the
findings of the Argentine River Uruguay Environmental Surveillance (URES)
programme.”59

While it might be easy to miss, it is important to note that the
Court does not make factual findings with regard to claims other
than the phosphorous claim.60 The Court comes close at times to
making a factual conclusion.61 For instance, it points to certain
reports that are inconsistent with Argentina’s submissions.62 But
such excursions by the Court are not an affirmative determination
of fact. They do not definitively conclude that dissolved oxygen
levels in the River Uruguay on the critical date were at or below a
certain level.63 Given the sophistication of the jurists on the Court,
it is hard to avoid that this (lack of a) conclusion is purposeful.
The conclusions in the Pulp Mills case therefore turn entirely
on the question of burdens of proof. The Court assigned the burden

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 97-98.
Id. at 98-99.
Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 99.
Id. at 100.
Id.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 93.
Id.
Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 93.
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to Argentina.64 Argentina did not meet its burden.65 It therefore did
not make out a claim for relief.66 Put another way, had the burden
of proof been on Uruguay in this case, Uruguay likely would have
lost the case. The Court precisely refused to make any affirmative
factual findings, as we have now seen. Consequently, the burden of
proof, and the burden of proof alone, was dispositive of the factual
questions in the case.
The importance of burdens of proof in the Court’s
jurisprudence is not unique to the Pulp Mills case. Rather, it is a
generally accepted proposition that the assignment of the burden
of proof is a central feature of the factfinding process.67 Pulp Mills
is a vivid illustration of how this principle is applied even in cases
in which the Court appears to suggest that it will make findings of
fact on its own recognizance rather than decide the case on the
relative strength of the evidence submitted by the parties.68 Even
in this context, burden is inescapable.
How then does the Court determine who has the burden of
proof? The rules on burdens of proof are generally wellestablished and straight forward. The Court in the Pulp Mills case
explained as follows: “in accordance with the well-established
principle of onus probandi incumbit actori, it is the duty of the party
which asserts certain facts to establish the existence of such
facts.”69 It went on to explain that “the Applicant should, in the first

64. Id. at 71.
65. Id. at 93, 97-8, 98-99, 99, 100.
66. Id.
67. Genocide Case (Croat. v. Serb.), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. 3, 73-75 (Feb. 3) (discussing
the importance of burden of proof); Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.),
Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. 61, 86 (Feb. 3) (same); Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu
Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malay. v. Sing.), Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. 12, 31 (May
23); Genocide Case (Bos. & Herz. v. Serb.), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, 127-29 (Feb. 26)
(same); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 392, 437 (Nov. 26).
68. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 72-73.
69. Id. at 71; Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 6, 1516 (June 15); see CHENG, supra note 12, at 327 (establishing burden of proof as a general
principle of law); ROBERT KOLB, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 931 (Hart Publishing
2013) (discussing assignment of burden of proof in International Court of Justice
jurisprudence); Anna Riddell, Evidence, Fact-Finding, and Experts, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF ADJUDICATION 858, 858-59 (Cesare Romano et al. eds., 2014) (discussing the principle in
current practice); DURWARD V. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 127
(University Press of Virginia 1939) (discussing the same principle in historical practice).
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instance, submit the relevant evidence to substantiate its claims.”70
It went on that “[t]his does not, however, mean that the
Respondent should not co-operate in the provision of such
evidence as may be in its possession that could assist the Court in
resolving the dispute submitted to it.”71
2. Presumptions Shift the Basic Rule
The Court in some circumstances is willing to soften this
operation of the burden of proof as a substitute for fact finding. The
Diallo case is one example of such a softening.72 In Diallo, Guinea
brought a case against the Democratic Republic of Congo for the
mistreatment of one of its nationals at the hands of the Congolese
authorities.73 Guinea alleged as one part of its case that the
Democratic Republic of Congo had failed to provide Diallo with
basic procedural guarantees.74 Given the alleged Kafkaesque
nature of these infractions, it would have been close to impossible
for Mr. Diallo (and thus Guinea) to provide documentary proof of
these infractions.
The Court in this context appeared willing to adjust the
ordinary operation of burdens of proof against the moving party.75
It explained that the burden of proof “varies according to the type
of facts which it is necessary to establish for the purposes of the
decision of the case.”76 Specifically, “where, as in these
proceedings, it is alleged that a person has not been afforded, by a
public authority, certain procedural guarantees to which he was
entitled, it cannot as a general rule be demanded of the Applicant
that it prove the negative fact which it is asserting.”77
The Court did not however reverse the burden of proof.78
Cryptically, it concluded that “[i]t is for the Court to evaluate all the
evidence produced by the two Parties and duly subjected to
70. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 71.
71. Id.
72. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 639
(Nov. 30) [hereinafter Diallo].
73. Id. at 645.
74. Id. at 659-60.
75. Compare Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 71 (setting out the ordinary operation of
burdens as quoted above), with Diallo, 2010 I.C.J. at 660 (softening the burden of proof).
76. Diallo, 2010 I.C.J. at 660.
77. Id. at 660-61.
78. Id. at 661.
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adversarial scrutiny, with a view to forming its conclusions.”79 As
“when it comes to establishing facts such as those which are at
issue in the present case, neither party is alone in bearing the
burden of proof.”80
Here then, the Court appears to say that it would make the
kinds of affirmative findings of fact that it avoided in Pulp Mills.81 It
would no longer rule that it “has not, however, found sufficient
evidence to conclude that” the Respondent breached its
obligations.82 Applied more broadly, it would have to hold that on
the whole, the record requires the making of a finding of fact in
situations like Diallo. Once such a fact of fact has been made, it
would then in turn be possible to rule on the question whether a
respondent has (or has not) breached an international legal
obligation.
It is tempting to view the Diallo decision as affecting standards
of proof rather than burdens of proof. As discussed in the next
section, the standard of proof governs the amount and quality of
evidence needed to support a finding. The Diallo Court appears to
be saying that it will permit Guinea to establish a fact with less
evidence, or evidence less directly in support of its contentions,
than it otherwise would have.83 This conclusion would not affect
burdens of proof.
The Court, however, does more than that.84 It adjusted the
burden of proof by introducing a presumption into the operation
of burdens.85 The presumption it introduced is that governmental
agencies keep records of their own, ordinary application of
procedural guarantees in due course.86 This presumption does not
just substitute for a piece of evidence. Rather, it interacts directly
with the process of fact finding itself: the presumption affects how
the Court engages in its fact-finding mission by requiring it to make
a factual finding unlike the posture in Pulp Mills even in the face of
no other record evidence supporting Guinea’s contention rather
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See generally Pulp Mills (Arg. v. Urug.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14 (Apr. 20).
82. Id. at 100.
83. Diallo, 2010 I.C.J. at 661.
84. Id.
85. See id. (“A public authority is generally able to demonstrate that it has followed
the appropriate procedures”).
86. Id.
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than what facts it finds.87 In Pulp Mills a presumption would have
been one tool to satisfy a burden of proof but the Court could still
have refused to make a finding at all by reference to applicable
burdens.88 Diallo invokes a presumption to deprive the Court of
this option to return nonsuit by ordinary operation of burdens of
proof.89
Diallo reveals the fundamental importance of presumptions:
presumptions can alter the process of fact finding.90 Presumptions
are applied not to the record but to the manner of application of
burdens and standards of proof. They can alter even the most basic
features we take for granted—the rule that the moving party must
shoulder the burden of proving the facts upon which it relies or fail
in making out its factual case. This central importance of
presumptions means that they deserve significant scrutiny as they
are at the heart of the fact-finding process of international justice—
they define how international justice knows or understands the
world in which it operates.
3. Burdens, Presumptions, and (Post-)Truth
The discussion so far should readily bring to light what our
problems are if we seek to rely on the international law of evidence
as the rule of law toolkit to address the post-truth syndrome. First,
it might certainly seem intuitive to say that the person who wants
to make a factual submission must prove the point to the
satisfaction of its audience.91 However, if we apply the Pulp Mills
matrix to the question of climate change (either existential threat
or “Chinese hoax”), one might think twice.92 We hear people
87. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 100; FREDERIC G. SOURGENS, KABIR DUGGAL & IAN LAIRD,
EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 291 (2018) (Evidentiary Principles
§1(1)).
88. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 100.
89. Diallo, 2010 I.C.J. at 661.
90. Id.
91. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 71.
92. Louis Jacobsen, Yes, Donald Trump Did Call Climate Change a Chinese Hoax,
POLITIFACT
(June
3,
2016),
https://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/statements/2016/jun/03/hillary-clinton/yes-donald-trump-did-call-climatechange-chinese-h/ [https://perma.cc/7SBX-H77J]; Andrew O’Reilly, Trump Hedges on
Climate Change Denial in Wake of Hurricane Michael; Says 'There Is Something There,’
FOXNEWS.COM (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-hedges-onclimate-change-denial-in-wake-of-hurricane-michael-says-there-is-something-there
[https://perma.cc/Q4GB-QRMH].
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engaged in the post-truth discourse on climate change say “I am
not a climate scientist, but . . . ” and then raise cold winter
temperatures as a reason to doubt “global warming.”93 This is not
unlike the Pulp Mills decision: in it, the Court seems to say “I am not
an environmental scientist, but . . . . ” Moreover, to place the burden
on the party seeking to assert a human link to environmental
degradation in a mechanical fashion, as Pulp Mills appears to have
done, is itself a tool all too familiar to any person watching Fox
News.94
Second, the embedding of presumptions in the burden of
proof we encountered in Diallo, too, might look reasonable. But
again, the question arises: whose presumption governs?
Presumptions draw on narrative, and if narrative affects the
manner in which we apply burdens of proof, we are again
perilously close to falling into the trap of post-truth discourse
rather than to providing a tool to remedying it. The rule of law, in
other words, must do better than this use of burdens of proof to
live up to its aspirations to be a post-truth antidote. A step to
addressing this problem is the standard of proof.
B. Standard of Proof
Global justice in general requires the moving party to
convince the “inner conviction” of the judge of the facts asserted.95
Confusingly, this global standard has been compared to the
preponderance standard and the clear and convincing evidence

93. Rebecca Onion, How to Stop Falling for the “I’m not a Scientist” Trap, SLATE (Nov.
29,
2018),
https://slate.com/technology/2018/11/donald-trump-not-a-scientistclimate-denialism-rhetoric.html [https://perma.cc/3P2K-7CPE]; Abby Smith, Trump Says
World Will ‘Start Getting Cooler’ as Biden Criticizes Him as a ‘Climate Arsonist’, WASH.
EXAMINER
(Sept.
14,
2020),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/energy/trump-says-world-will-startgetting-cooler-as-biden-criticizes-him-as-a-climate-arsonist
[https://perma.cc/9T7LULZY].
94. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 71; Michael Guillen, Physicist: Don’t Fall for the Argument
about
‘Settled
Science’,
FOX
NEWS
(Jan.
21,
2019),
https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/physicist-dont-fall-for-the-argument-about-settledscience [https://perma.cc/XM6L-GNB7].
95. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
Dissent, 2005 I.C.J. 361, 361 (Dec. 19) (dissenting opinion by Kateka J.).
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standard.96 Pragmatically, the standard appears to oscillate
between the two in requiring more than a mere preponderance but
requiring less than clear and convincing evidence without precise
demarcation as to the amount of proof required.97
Given this standard, it is intriguing to see how the Court
addressed the question whether all cases are created equal in
terms of the applicable standard of proof when it was asked to do
so head-on. The issue was litigated in the 1949 Corfu Channel
case.98 Corfu Channel involved a claim by the United Kingdom
against Albania with regard to deaths and significant damage done
to Royal Navy vessels by mines laid in the North Corfu Straight on
October 22, 1946.99 The United Kingdom asserted that it had
recently cleared mines in the straight in 1944 and re-swept the
straight in 1945.100 On its passage in October 1946, the British
destroyer Saumarez nevertheless hit a mine on its sailing through
the straight.101 The Volage attempting to rescue the Saumarez also
struck a mine.102 Both vessels were severely damaged as a
result.103 The incident caused the death of 44 sailors and injured an
additional 42.104 The United Kingdom argued that Albania had
colluded with the Yugoslav navy to lay the mines in question to
impede future (British) traffic through the channel in violation of
international law.105
The United Kingdom thus alleged as one of its theories of the
case that the mines had been laid by Yugoslav vessels with the
express permission of the Albanian government.106 As proof, the
United Kingdom submitted testimony from LCdr. Kovacic,
formerly of the Yugoslav Navy. 107 He testified he witnessed two
vessels loading mines at Sibenik (Yugoslavia) and leaving port, and
96. See Kevin M. Clermont, Standards of Proof in Japan and the United States, 37
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 263, 266 (2004) (situating the standard in the context of US standards of
proof).
97. Kolb, supra note 69, at 944.
98. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
99. Id. at 10-11.
100. Id. at 10.
101. Id. at 12.
102. Id. at 13.
103. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 10.
104. Id. at 10.
105. Id. at 16.
106. See id. at 15.
107. Id. at 8.
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then observed their return “a few days after the occurrence of the
explosions.”108
The case posed delicate questions regarding the applicable
standard of proof. Yugoslavia was not a party to the Corfu Channel
proceedings.109 It therefore did not present evidence (or examined
LCdr. Kovacic).110 This meant that there was reasonably little in
evidence to counter LCdr. Kovacic’s account of events as the party
with the evidence in question was (legitimately) absent. An
ordinary application of a standard of proof would thus suggest that
some credible evidence carries the day over no evidence—i.e., that
the United Kingdom would prevail on its claim. Given the
procedural posture of the case, this was deeply problematic not the
least of which because it would imply liability for a third and
absent party, Yugoslavia.111
The Court dealt with the question by going into further detail
regarding the applicable standard of proof. It ruled: “[w]ithout
deciding as to the personal sincerity of the witness Kovacic, or the
truth of what he said, the Court finds that the facts stated by the
witness from his personal knowledge are not sufficient to prove
what the United Kingdom Government considered them to
prove.”112 The Court explained that “[a] charge of such exceptional
gravity against a State would require a degree of certainty that has
not been reached here.”113 Narrowly, a grave allegation of
wrongdoing must be supported by credible evidence that requires
only limited inferences: seeing Yugoslav vessels loaded with mines
leave port at Sibenik and returning after a voyage is consistent with
the laying of mines in the channel. But it does not directly suggest
the laying of mines in the channel—the vessels in question
plausibly could have had an entirely different mission. At the very
least, the witness would have had to place the vessels in the
channel acting in a manner consistent with laying mines.
The Court’s holding thus altered the standard of proof by
requiring not more proof (i.e., 15 additional eye witnesses) but a
108. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 16.
109. Id. at 17.
110. Id. at 17.
111. For a discussion of why this would be problematic from a procedural point of
view, see Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v. Fr., U.K. & U.S.), Judgment,
1954 I.C.J. 19, 18-19 (June 15).
112. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 16.
113. Id. at 17.
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different kind of proof that permits the inference in question with
more immediacy. The Court continues to apply this heightened
evidentiary requirement to this day.114
The key to understanding this application of the standard of
proof in Corfu Channel (and later ICJ jurisprudence) is to contrast
it with the manner in which the Court ultimately ruled against
Albania in the case. The Court ruled that Albania did not itself lay
the mines.115 Further, the Court did not find in favor of the United
Kingdom with regard to the connivance theory.116 Rather, the
Court ruled that the presence of the mines in Albanian waters
permitted a relaxation of standards of proof as Albania was best
positioned to provide an explanation for their presence.117 The
Court further inferred knowledge of the presence of the mines
from the lack of protest against mining in its waters after the
minefield in question had officially been recorded and the ease
with which geography permitted Albania to observe the straight
from its coastline.118
The Court expressly placed this discussion of the standard of
proof in the context of its discussion of burdens of proof.119 Thus,
the Court ruled that the case did not shift the burden of proof to
Albania but affected the standard of proof.120 This standard of
proof was placed directly in the context of more liberal recourse to
inferences and circumstantial evidences given the facts at bar and
the relative access to evidence enjoyed by the parties.121
Viewed together, the Corfu Channel decision thus heightened
and lowered the standard of proof in the same decision with regard
to the same question—who was responsible for the laying of mines
in the straight? This would on its face appear to be further proof of
a lack of evidentiary rigor by the Court. The same type of allegation
should require any factfinder to apply the same standard of proof,
114. See Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of
Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 178-79 (Feb. 3); see also Application
of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb.
& Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 209 (Feb. 26).
115. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 16.
116. See id. at 16-18.
117. Id. at 18.
118. Id. at 18-20.
119. See id. at 18.
120. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 18.
121. Id.
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if not between different disputes, at least in the same judgment.
The oscillation on point is therefore disquieting.
Despite this facial incongruence, it is nevertheless possible to
tease out a common denominator for the Court’s fact-finding
process. The application of the standard of proof followed a
common factor: presumptions. Specifically, the process becomes
uniform when we ask how could the Court draw inferences
consistent with its expectation of how states (ought to) behave? On
the one hand, one would not expect a state to connive in breaking
the law with a particular partner.122 Such an inference therefore
requires more direct proof.123 On the other hand, one would expect
a state to know of, and take affirmative action with regard to,
notorious minelaying by a third party in a strategic part of
territorial waters.124 The standard of proof thus described the
manner in which the Court was willing to draw facially opposite
inferences on the basis of a common set of presumptions about
plausible state action in the case.125 In classical international
adjudication, standards of proof, therefore, only make sense when
they are evaluated in the broader context of inferences and
presumptions in the context of which they operate.
This use of standards of proof is certainly helpful in
addressing the concerns raised in the context of post-truth
discourse in the previous section. We see that burdens are not
nakedly imposed. Rather, they are inherently sensitive to context.
In this context, burdens and standards operate so as to take
the sting out of some of the invective underlying the post-truth
discourse: the fear of the hoax or connivance.126 To place the
discussion back in the context of climate change deniers on
television, the use of standards of proof in Corfu Channel would be
highly skeptical of anyone ascribing motive to scientists warning
of potential dangers.127 This may thus help to bring parties back to
the table to have an honest discussion rather than hurling
narrative-based innuendo.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See id. at 16-18.
See id. at 16.
See id. at 18-20.
See Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 20.
See id. at 16-18; see also Jacobson, supra note 92.
See Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 16-18.
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More centrally, the use of standards of proof as evidenced by
Corfu Channel is an antidote to strategies glorified in the “Rules of
Radicals” manuals (or their current understandings, at any rate).128
These manuals suggest as one of the first steps of radical discourse
to use such innuendo to discredit one’s opponent and create an
atmosphere of fear or anxiety.129 Sadly, it appears that in a posttruth society, the use of such techniques has become common.130
Or, as one leading international legal scholar recently put it, the
“manipulation of anxiety is a standard technique of social
control.”131 The use of standards of proof would minimize
manipulations of anxiety by requiring affirmative proof of such
claims rather than mere innuendo thus taking at least some of the
wind out of the sails of radical discourse participants.
However, as much as standards of proof appear helpful in
resolving some of the problems we encounter in the post-truth
discourse, it again highlights the importance of narratives. The
standard of proof is highly narrative dependent because it, too,
relies upon presumptions. The question then becomes—how do
we justify the use of presumptions? Could they not be easily
replaced by other, more corrosive presumptions premised in
alternative narratives? The point is important as it is a central tenet
of Rules for Radicals to “[n]ever go outside of the experience of your
people.”132 The link between experience, narrative, and
presumption is thus as central to poisoning or radicalizing
discourse in post-truth society as it is a potential antidote to it. In
other words, the law governing presumptions is going to be
instrumental in understanding the rule of law answer to narrativebased discourse—or in revealing that rule of law has no such
answer.

128. SAUL D. ALINSKY, RULES FOR RADICALS (1971); see generally Noam Cohen, Know
Thine
Enemy,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
22,
2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/23/weekinreview/23alinsky.html
[https://perma.cc/E2HB-WZ6J].
129. ALINSKY, supra note 128, at 99.
130. See Michael Tackett & Maggie Haberman, Trump Once Said Power Was About
Instilling Fear. In That Case, He Should Be Worried, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/04/us/politics/fear-trump.html
[https://perma.cc/9JLG-CJEQ] (discussing the use of fear).
131. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, THE QUEST FOR WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 67 (2012).
132. ALINSKY, supra note 128, at 127.
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C. Burdens and Standards Cannot Operate Without Presumptions
The analysis of the leading forms of international justice has
established that burdens and standards of proof are the
foundational building blocks for fact finding in international
dispute resolution. The discussion so far has also shown that these
burdens and standards of proof do not operate mechanically or
blindly. Rather, they operate in close interaction with the law of
inferences and in particular the law of evidentiary presumptions.
These presumptions determine how justice knows the facts and
appreciates how the burden of proof is to be applied in any given
case to resolve hard cases. This means that evidentiary
presumptions and their relationship to inferences constitute the
core operational code of international dispute resolution—the
principle that determines how to resolve factual disputes following
the international rule of law.
III. INFERENCES AND PRESUMPTIONS
The role of inferences and presumptions becomes more
readily apparent still when one dissects how proof in international
dispute resolution actually progresses. This section begins with the
much-touted preferences for direct evidence and how such
evidence interacts with proof by inferences. Specifically, it explains
how proof by inference in most (if not all) cases is actually
dispositive of the factual questions to be resolved by a court or
tribunal. The section then looks at the relationship between
inferences and presumptions. It submits that presumptions are a
certain kind of general inference. It then outlines how these
general presumptions overlap with specific inferences in order to
dispose of contested factual questions in international
adjudication and international arbitration.
A. Proof by Direct Evidence
It is almost a knee-jerk reaction to prefer direct evidence over
circumstantial evidence. This knee-jerk reaction has been
hardwired into our TV viewing habits: we have been fed “your case
is entirely circumstantial” as good lawyerly argument to discredit
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an assertion from Legal Eagles to Law & Order to Bull.133 This kneejerk reaction is to a certain extent present in international dispute
resolution, but it must be placed in context of the central work
inferences play when assessing direct evidence.
International justice—like our average television viewer—
has a preference for direct evidence. As one recent work restating
the rules of evidence in the international investment arbitration
context has noted, arbitrators “when possible shall make findings
of fact by means of direct evidence.”134 This preference for direct
evidence also underlies international adjudication at the
International Court of Justice.135
While we are used to the distinction between direct evidence
and circumstantial evidence from a steady diet of courtroom
dramas, what constitutes direct evidence is far less clear.
According to a classic definition, direct evidence “proves a fact
without an inference or presumption and which in itself, if true,
establishes that fact.”136 When asked, we might think of an
eyewitness.137 Or we might, mistakenly it turns out, think of real
evidence like a gun or the smudge of blood left behind on a broken
ground floor window. (This real evidence requires inferences to
establish a fact—the gun was used in the crime, the defendant held
it, the blood on the window was left by the assailant at a certain
time etc.).138
As the discussion below will show, witness evidence is far
more controversial in the international setting than it is in the US
setting. International justice instead relies predominantly upon a
different kind of evidence as its primary source of direct evidence:

133. See Jim Cash & Jack Epps, Jr., script authors, Legal Eagles (1986) Quotes, IMDB,
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0091396/quotes [https://perma.cc/8RLX-83GE] (last
visited Oct. 4, 2020); see also Robert Nathan, script author, Law & Order, The Secret Sharers
(1991)
Quotes,
IMDB,
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0629460/quotes
[https://perma.cc/Q5LC-TWB4] (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
134. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 292.
135. Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v.
Nicar.), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. 665, 733 (Dec. 16) (noting the absence of direct evidence
submitted by Nicaragua as a significant factor in its decision).
136. Kevin J. Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 241, 248 (2006) (quoting BARBARA E. BERGMAN & NANCY HOLLANDER, WHARTON’S
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §1“8” (1997)).
137. Heller, supra note 136, at 248.
138. Id. at 251.
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contemporaneous documentary evidence.139 (This evidence is not
formally primary in the US setting as it is almost by definition
hearsay evidence, i.e., an out of court of statement submitted for
the truth of the matter asserted.)140 This section will outline the
key differences between the treatment of this preferred form of
evidence and witness evidence.
1. Contemporaneous Documentary Evidence
Contemporaneous documentary evidence is the gold
standard for global dispute resolution. This standard has been
embraced in international adjudication,141 and plays a central role
in international arbitration.142 It has come to stand for the most
immediate and most trustworthy kind of evidence upon which a
decision may be based.
This trustworthiness is partly due to the types of questions
international justice is asked to resolve. Take, for example, two
staples of the Court’s Jurisprudence: border delimitations and
maritime claims.143 When the International Court of Justice is
asked to delimit a border, or determine a maritime claim, one of
the issues will be one party’s historical claim to the particular
area.144 This historical claim would be difficult to establish by
means of witness testimony as the witness would have to have
knowledge of prevailing circumstances centuries ago.145 Witness
evidence in this context is therefore far less valuable as a practical
matter.
Therefore, directly establishing such historical claims will be
contingent upon historical documents. These documents will most
139. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 299.
140. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). Of course, contemporaneous documents authored by a
party opponent are defined as “not hearsay” for purposes of the federal rules. FED. R. EVID.
801(2).
141. Simone Halink, All Things Considered: How the International Court of Justice
Delegated its Fact Assessment to the United Nations in the Armed Activities Case, 40 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 13, 22 (2008).
142. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 299.
143. See John R. Crook, The International Court of Justice and Human Rights, 1 NW. J.
INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 3 (2004) (“More than half its cases have involved disputes over land
frontiers and maritime boundaries”).
144. Brian Taylor Sumner, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice, 53
DUKE L.J. 1779, 1789 (2004).
145. See id. at 1789-90 (discussing the importance of history in border
delimitations).

2020]

TRUTHS IN TRANSLATION

127

clearly establish the state of affairs at the time of the making of the
document. The most frequent such document is a map.146 Maps
play an outsized role in international dispute resolution as a direct
evidence of the respective (historical) claims of the parties.
Even with such maps, one needs to be careful. The Court in the
Frontier Dispute case explained that maps “of themselves, and by
virtue solely of their existence, cannot constitute a territorial title,
that is, a document endowed by international law with intrinsic
legal force for the purpose of establishing territorial rights.”147 In
other words, maps are evidence of a fact, not an instrument of
title.148 They are certainly probative as direct evidence of
contemporaneous views of their drafters. Their probative force
will vary, however, depending upon the accuracy and technical
reliability with which they have been made.149
In this sense, maps are not different from an eyewitness who
after all is only as good as her eyesight permits her to be. Further
their credibility may be called into question even if they have
significant probative force. The question why the map was drawn
up looms large in this context.150 Further, it might even be proved
that the map is not authentic to a relevant period.151 Finally, even
if one establishes a credible historical claim on the basis of a map,
this is not the only factor to be considered as a matter of law.152
Other such factors considered by the Court include geography (for
which different, contemporary maps may be more instructive than
historical ones), cultural identity, and, centrally, earlier negotiated
settlements of boundary questions.153

146. See, e.g., Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 9-32 (June
15) (discussing maps); Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), 2014 I.C.J. 3, 64 (Jan. 27) (same);
Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.) , 2009 I.C.J. 61, 83 (Feb. 3) (same).
147. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 554, 582 (Dec. 22);
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. V. Colom.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 624, 661-2 (Nov.
19) (quoting Burk. Faso v. Mali, 1986 I.C.J. at 582).
148. Burk. Faso v. Mali, 1986 I.C.J. at 582.
149. Id.; see also Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Niger), 2013 I.C.J. 44, 76 (Apr. 16)
(relying on the 1986 Frontier Dispute case for the same point); Peru v. Chile, 2014 I.C.J. at
64 (maps focus on the locations inapposite to the litigation).
150. Burk. Faso v. Mali, 1986 I.C.J. at 583.
151. See id. at 584 (noting the curious disappearances of maps appended to treaties
and the presence of an apparent wealth of cartographic evidence “for a region which is
nevertheless described as being partly unknown”).
152. See Sumner, supra note 144, at 1779-80; see, e.g., Rom. v. Ukr., 2009 I.C.J. at 83.
153. See Sumner, supra note 144, at 1780; Rom. v. Ukr., 2009 I.C.J. at 83.
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Many international adjudications turn critically on the
diplomatic engagement between two states. Fact finding in these
cases relies on two types of contemporaneous documents: (1)
diplomatic notes154 and (2) contemporaneous governmental
documents relating to the conduct of foreign affairs.155 The East
Greenland case is an early example of the use of direct evidence in
such cases.156 The East Greenland case in relevant part concerned
the question whether Norway had ceded its claim to sovereignty
over Greenland to Denmark.157 As evidence of such a cession,
Denmark submitted that Norway’s Foreign Minister, Mr. Ihlen, had
made a promise to cede Norway’s claim to Greenland in exchange
for Danish concessions with regard to Norwegian claims to the
island of Spitzbergen.158
The Danish case rested on two distinct sets of documents as
direct evidence for the promise.159 It relied in the first place upon
Ihlen’s own protocol entries regarding the conversations with his
Danish counterpart.160 It then placed these protocols into context
of diplomatic exchanges between Denmark and Norway at the time
by submitting its own documents preparing the conversation with
the Norwegian foreign minister.161 It finally looked to later
diplomatic correspondence between Denmark and Norway, in
which Denmark repeated claims to Greenland and Norway refused
to ratify the earlier remarks.162
The Court relied as direct evidence upon these
contemporaneous documents.163 It considered first and foremost
the protocol entries of Mr. Ihlen made at or shortly after the

154. See, e.g., Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 53 (Apr. 5); Sovereignty over Palau Litigan and Palau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), 2001
I.C.J. 575, 592 (Oct. 23); Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Hond.), 2007 I.C.J. 659,
737 (Oct. 8); Sovereignty Over Pedra Branca (Malay. v. Sing.), 2008 I.C.J. 12, 27 (May 23);
Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Som. v. Kenya),2017 I.C.J. 3, 15 (Feb. 2).
155. Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea
(Nicar. v. Colo.), Judgment, 2016 I.C.J. 3, 28 (Mar. 17).
156. Den. v. Nor., 1933 P.C.I.J. at 37, 70.
157. Id. at 71.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 37, 70.
160. Id. at 70.
161. Den. v. Nor., 1933 P.C.I.J. at 70.
162. Id. at 37.
163. Id. at 70-72.
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discussions with the Danish foreign minister.164 To generalize, the
Court relied upon contemporaneous governmental documents
memorializing foreign affairs exchanges as primary means of
direct proof. It then also considered written diplomatic exchanges
as evidence to confirm the earlier oral exchanges.
The same pattern of a crisscrossing reliance on government
documents and diplomatic communications still remains in place
in contemporary dispute resolution before the Court.165 For
instance, Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces
in the Caribbean Sea involved a critical question when Nicaragua
notified Colombia of an alleged violation of its sovereign rights.166
Colombia submitted a diplomatic note sent by Nicaragua after the
institution of the proceedings before the Court, together with the
absence of previous notes, as direct evidence of this date.167 The
Court looked to Colombian governmental documents to establish
that Nicaragua had made oral demands of Colombia at an earlier
time.168 On this basis, the Court concluded that “Given the public
statements made by the highest representatives of the Parties,”
including presidential offers of negotiations extended by both
presidents, “Colombia could not have misunderstood the position
of Nicaragua over such differences.”169
Here, again, the use of contemporaneous governmental
documents about foreign affairs proved dispositive direct
evidence. The Court in this case used these documents to explain,
and provide context for, later diplomatic exchanges.170 The case
thus confirms the use of government documents and diplomatic
correspondence as a preferred means of proof through direct
evidence.
Despite this preference, a word of caution is needed:
ultimately, even contemporaneous documentary evidence is
viewed through the lens of presumptions. Thus, the Court typically
does not have a particular desire to get “behind” contemporaneous
foreign affairs related documents by looking at the documents of
164. Id. at 70-72.
165. Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea
(Nicar. v. Colo.), Judgment, 2016 I.C.J. 3, 26 (Mar. 17).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 28.
168. Id. at 32-33.
169. Id. at 31, 32-33.
170. Nicar. v. Colo., 2016 I.C.J. at 31, 32-33.
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other governmental departments. The issue most embarrassingly
came up in the Corfu Channel case already discussed above.171 One
of the questions the Court needed to establish was whether British
passage through the straight would qualify as “innocent passage”
(broadly, without belligerent intent) as the UK government
asserted.172 If the Court established that British passage was not
innocent, then the U.K. would lose its claim for the violation of its
rights to innocent passage by the mining efforts in the straights.173
The problem for the Court was that the Royal Navy had a
document—known as Document XCU—that outlined the reasons
for British passage through the straights, namely, reconnaissance
of Albanian naval defenses.174 Albania had requested production of
the document.175 The Court had ordered it be produced.176 After
much back and forth, the UK refused to produce it.177 And yet—the
Court did not draw the inference from the non-production of
Document XCU that British passage was not innocent.178 Why? The
question cannot definitively be answered. The Court on its face
appeared to reason that the documents could not have contained
any damning information as the British vessels did not fire upon
Albanian positions despite having struck mines.179 This conclusion
seems logically contorted as it does not follow that a
reconnaissance mission under the circumstances would require
the firing of shots if the British vessels in question struck mines (as
opposed to being fired upon from land).180 The British navy, in
other words received the benefit of the doubt in circumstances that
on their face would have justified significant suspicion.
What then really motivated the Court? It would appear that
the Court is loath to second guess the “secret” motivations of states
even on the basis of contemporaneous documentary evidence. In
171. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 4 (Apr. 9).
172. Id. at 10.
173. See id. at 28.
174. Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark Pollack, International Judicial Performances and the
Performance of the International Court, in THE PERFORMANCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 261, 279 (Theresa Squatrito et al. eds., 2018).
175. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 32.
176. Id.
177. Id.; Dunoff & Pollack, supra note 174 (describing discussions relating to the nonproduction of documents in Corfu Channel); REISMAN, supra note 131, at 45 (same).
178. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 32.
179. Id.
180. See id.

2020]

TRUTHS IN TRANSLATION

131

more political terms, the Court may very well be unwilling to rub
the noses of the world community in deeply problematic areas of
foreign policy. To second guess states’ motives is to assign more
than a modicum of blame.181 In Corfu Channel, the Court would
have assigned such blame to a Western power (the U.K.) with
regard to potentially belligerent intent towards an Eastern bloc
country (Albania).182 Such an exercise is a dangerous proposition
for a Court that in the end relies upon the consent of disputing
parties across the geopolitical divides to its jurisdiction.183
Further, it is potentially unhelpful to the pacific resolution of
international disputes. Guilt and blame beget more deflections of
blame without necessarily permitting the resolution of factual
disputes on common ground.184 In Corfu Channel, such blame
would have brought forth claims that Albania (and the Soviet bloc)
was the true aggressor and that Britain was merely “defending
itself” and its rights of navigation.185 The post-truth era has made
this phenomenon the more readily apparent: facts can be brushed
aside with alternative facts when arguments of blame and identity
collide.186 To shy away from finding facts that would elicit an
identity-based (rather than a strictly factual) response might
therefore be a condition sine qua non for pacific dispute settlement
to be possible more generally. Pacific dispute settlement
mechanisms can do so by invoking presumptions. And this use of
presumptions allows pacific dispute settlement to avoid the taboo
of sliding from legal dispute into political confrontation.187

181. Jean Bethke Elshtain, The Perils of Legal Moralism, 20 J.L. & POL. 549, 564 (2004)
(discussing the problem through the lens of legalistic moralism).
182. LCDR Weston D. Burnett, Mediterranean Mare Clausum in the Year 2000?: An
International Law Analysis of Peacetime Military Navigation in the Mediterranean, 34 NAVAL
L. REV. 75, 78 (1985) (placing Albania and the Corfu Channel dispute in the East-West
conflict context).
183. See Michael D. Nolan & Frederic G. Sourgens, Limits of Consent, Arbitration
Without Privity and Beyond, in LIBER AMICORUM BERNARDO CREMADES 873 (Miguel Ángel
Fernández-Ballesteros & David Arias, eds. 2010).
184. David S. Rubenstein, Immigration Blame, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 125 passim (2018)
(explaining the psychological mechanism in the immigration context).
185. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 32 (Apr. 9) (hinting that the
document was about first shots being fired by Albania).
186. See Strong, supra note 2, at 137.
187. CARL SCHMITT, DER BEGRIFF DES POLITISCHEN 27 (1932).
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2. Witness Testimony
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the specter of political decision is the
more concrete when parties rely upon witness testimony to prove
their case. This potentially undergirds the skepticism of many
international jurists towards witness testimony as a good means
to establish facts. This skepticism has already surfaced in the
discussion of key international jurisprudence so far: the
International Court of Justice found a way around witness
testimony in Corfu Channel.188 Further, the Court appeared
unwilling to make difficult credibility findings in the Pulp Mills
case.189 This distant engagement with witness evidence is apparent
throughout the Court’s jurisprudence.190
One of the chief reasons becomes apparent when examining
the robust use of witnesses in a different international dispute
resolution context: investor-state arbitration. As Corfu Channel has
shown, witness testimony tends to ascribe motive (why did the
vessels leave port?).191 This motive (or lack thereof) is frequently
dispositive in the context of investor-state disputes.192 Thus, an
issue may arise whether a government official purposefully
delayed responding to a letter and therefore made it “disappear.”
Witness testimony can establish when the document actually
arrived and what happened to it next and why.193 Similarly, the
question whether a government official was in fact authorized by
his or her superiors to sign a key document—and why the official
would have signed the document without authorization—is an
issue as to which witness testimony can frequently be
dispositive.194 Finally, the reason for increased governmental

188. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 17.
189. Pulp Mills, Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, 72-73 (Apr. 20).
190. See Frontier Dispute (Benin v. Niger), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 90, 128 (July 12)
(noting the lack of reliance by the party submitting testimony on the testimony in
question).
191. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 17.
192. See Todd Weiler, Standards of Treatment, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 259, 285 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008) (noting the
centrality of the concept of arbitrary conduct in investor-state arbitrations).
193. See, e.g., RSM Production Corp. v. Grenada, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/14, Award,
¶¶ 182-89 (Mar. 11, 2009).
194. See, e.g., Churchill Mining PLC and Planet Mining Pty Ltd v. Republic of
Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14, Award, ¶ 306 (Dec. 6, 2016).
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action is frequently a matter that would not have been committed
to writing.195
The importance of witness evidence led one investor-state
tribunal to take the momentous step to compel a sitting minister to
testify. In the Tulip v. Turkey arbitration, a key question was the
reason why a housing project was terminated.196 Turkey submitted
that it had commercial reasons for doing so.197 The claimant
insisted that it had a right to examine the person with direct person
knowledge of the underlying events—a person for whom Turkey
had not submitted a witness statement.198 The person in question
was a sitting minister in the Turkish government.199 The tribunal
agreed and required that Turkey make the minister available for
cross-examination.200
Such a result would be highly unusual in other contexts. The
calling of a witness under these circumstances would likely
increase the danger for international dispute resolution to slip into
the kind of political spectacle that the Corfu Channel court so deftly
managed to circumnavigate.201 It would therefore be unlikely that
the witness would be called despite the fact that the witness’
testimony is clearly material for the outcome of the case. Witness
testimony, in other words, is difficult for international justice
precisely because it requires one to take sides. To take it seriously
is to make findings of credibility that call into question politically
laden narratives. Such decisions again bring the specter of blame
and alternative facts to the heart of the international dispute
resolution enterprise. International justice thus tends to treat
witness testimony the way a groomer would a porcupine—with
great care.

195. See, e.g., Apotex Holdings Inc. and Apotex Inc. v. U.S., ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/12/1, Award, ¶ 3.30 (Aug. 25, 2014).
196. Tulip Real Estate Inv. & Dev. BV v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, Award, ¶
60 (Mar. 10, 2014). The Author acted for Tulip Real Estate Investment & Development BV
in the annulment proceeding in the same dispute.
197. Id. at ¶ 417.
198. Tulip Real Estate Inv. & Dev. BV v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28,
Annulment, ¶ 115 (Dec. 30, 2015).
199. Tulip Real Estate Inv. & Dev. BV v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, Award, ¶
37 (Mar. 10, 2014).
200. Id.
201. See Section II.B.
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3. The Quest for “Corroboration”
How does international justice seek to handle witness
testimony with such care so as to avoid falling into the trap of
political confrontation (as opposed to judicial dispute resolution)?
The core principle used in international justice is to look for
corroboration for potentially explosive witness evidence.202 The
Court provided a general indication of the standard it would apply
when examining the probative value of witness testimony: was the
statement “relied on by the other Party” or “corroborated by
impartial, neutral sources.”203 This quest for corroboration is an
attempt to dislodge witness testimony from its place in a narrative
and to replace it instead in the context of “neutral” facts.204
This type of corroboration can broadly come in three ways.
First, a witness may simply provide greater detail or precision than
what has already been established in broad outline by
documentary evidence. In this case, the witness testimony would
be corroborated by direct, documentary evidence. One such
example of direct corroboration is the testimony of Professor
Ackermann in the Temple of Preah Request for Interpretation case
before the International Court of Justice.205 Professor Ackermann
had visited the site at issue in the dispute in 1961 and provided a
detailed discussion of his observations from that time.206 The Court
made several findings of fact based on Professor Ackermann’s
testimony.207 The Court did not make any direct credibility
findings. Instead, the Court looked for corroboration for Professor
Ackermann’s testimony. It found this corroboration in submissions
by counsel, as well as in relevant maps. It thus relied upon the
testimony together with “a number of other factors.”208 This
treatment is consistent with other cases, in which the Court

202. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶ 298 (Dec. 19); Request for Interpretation of the Judgment
of 15 June 1962 Concerning the Temple of Preah (Cambodia v. Thai.), 2013 I.C.J. 281, 312
(Nov. 11) (“Preah Interpretation”); Territorial and Maritime Dispute in the Caribbean Sea
(Nicar. v. Hond.), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 659, 717-18 (Oct. 8).
203. Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. at ¶ 298.
204. Id.
205. Preah Interpretation, 2013 I.C.J. at 312.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 312-14.
208. Id. at 313.
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appears to have relied in part upon witness testimony as part of its
findings of facts.209
One of the features to note in this context is that the Court
looks to documents to corroborate witness testimony. Whether
this witness testimony is tested against licenses issued by the state
proffering the witness or against maps, the Court tends to look to
documents to confirm witness testimony and to use witness
testimony where the documents already permit an inference as to
the underlying facts in question—so long as the witness testimony
can provide the Court with greater precision.210
Second, corroboration can be more attenuated. After all, much
of the need for witness testimony in international disputes arises
from the absence of documentary proof. One way to corroborate a
witness account is to obtain further witness testimony to the same
effect. Two different witnesses could corroborate each other’s
accounts.211 Alternatively, if such witnesses are not willing or able
to testify in person, contemporaneous reports may identify thirdparty statements consistent with the witness testimony.212 These
reports would corroborate the witness through hearsay
evidence.213 In both instances, the corroboration would come by
way of direct or indirect witness testimony.
Third, a witness may not be able to rely upon others for direct
corroboration, at all. Rather, the corroboration will need to come
from context.214 The witness in this instance would hold a puzzle
piece that fits with the rest of the record evidence. Although there
is no corroboration for the information on the witness’ piece of the
puzzle, the fact that the witness’ testimony fits with the rest of the
picture already assembled by the record can also provide a

209. Territorial and Maritime Dispute in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.),
Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 659, ¶ 190-92, 195(Oct. 8).
210. See id.; Preah Interpretation, 2013 I.C.J. at ¶ 86.
211. See Churchill Mining PLC v. Indon., ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14, Award, ¶ 141
(Dec. 6, 2016).
212. See SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 292 (discussing circumstantial hearsay
evidence).
213. Id.
214. See Salini Costruttori S.P.A. v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 34 (July 16, 2001) (using the legal framework established independently by
the tribunal to corroborate its understanding of the nature of a contract).
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different, circumstantial kind of corroboration for the witness’
account.215
This quest for corroboration can play out in unexpected ways.
The Tulip v. Turkey arbitration again is instructive.216 As discussed
in the previous section, the Tulip tribunal took the momentous step
to require live testimony from a sitting minister to shed light onto
the state’s motives for ultimately terminating the investment
relationship with Tulip.217 The Tulip tribunal took the less
momentous step to ignore the minister’s testimony—despite the
fact that it broadly supported Tulip’s case and tended to detract
from Turkey’s defense.218 The Tulip tribunal did not explain its
decision not to mention the minister’s testimony.219 An annulment
panel asked to review the award did: the tribunal’s choice was “an
illustration of exercising its judicial function of choosing which
evidence it finds relevant and which it does not.”220 The tribunal
found that the conclusion drawn from the minister’s testimony by
Tulip was “not established by the evidentiary record.”221 In other
words, the tribunal did not find corroboration from other sources
(i.e. “the evidentiary record”) for the witness’ statement and
proceeded to ignore the testimony consistent with its “judicial
function.”222 The conclusion may be unexpected as a matter of
material justice—how is it consistent with a tribunal’s justice to
call a witness if not to address his testimony? It is however sadly
consistent with, and illustrates the price of, the corroboration
frame in international jurisprudence.223
Given this potential for unexpected outcomes, it is important
to understand what precisely international courts and tribunals do
when they look for corroboration. All three types of corroboration
ultimately depend upon different ways in which a tribunal can
draw an inference. The use of inferences is most visible when there
215. See Churchill Mining PLC, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14, at ¶ 140.
216. Tulip Real Estate Inv. & Dev. B.V. v. Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, Award, ¶
60 (Mar. 10, 2014).
217. Id.
218. Tulip Real Estate Inv. & Dev. B.V. v. Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, Decision
on Annulment, ¶¶ 154-55 (Dec. 30, 2015).
219. Id.
220. Id. at ¶ 149.
221. Id.
222. Tulip Real Estate Inv, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28 at ¶ 149.
223. In the interest of disclosure, the Author served as an expert for Tulip in the
annulment proceedings but has no current relationship with the parties.
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is no direct evidence that would support the witness’ testimony but
the witness testimony is consistent with other facts that have been
independently established. Corroboration and inference here
work visibly hand in glove: we confirm the testimony (the missing
puzzle piece) because we infer from context (the puzzle we have
already put together) that it “fits” and is accurate.
The use of inferences is similarly present in the other two
scenarios. The presence of documentary proof that is broadly
consistent with the testimony, if less precise than the testimony,
corroborates the witness testimony because we infer from the
general documentary proof to the specific witness testimony on
point. This inference functions like a forensic picture analysis on a
television crime drama. Those dramas frequently create cleaned
up, zoomed images from a blurry native file. We (and the TV
detectives) assume that the cleaned up, zoomed image is in fact a
feature of the reality pictured in the native file rather than an
external imprint left upon the image by the zooming process.224
This assumption is an inference from the similarity between the
enhanced and native image.
Finally, the corroboration of one eyewitness’ account of an
event with another eyewitness’ testimony also relies upon proof
by inference. Multiple people identify the defendants in My Cousin
Vinny as the robbers of the Sac-o-Suds convenience store.225 These
layers of consistent testimony create only an inference that the
perception of each of the witnesses was accurate and credible.
However, this does not prove directly that each witness reliably
saw what they say they saw. In fact, as My Cousin Vinny illustrates,
the witnesses were all mistaken.226 The witnesses corroborated
each other’s story but did not prove that the testimony was in fact
true by more than an inference that two people see more or see
better than one person.
To corroborate something means to support an inference as
to its truthfulness, but inferences are not without problems in their
224. See Sebastian Anthony, CSI-Style Super-Resolution Image Enlargement?
Yeeaaah!,
EXTREMETECH.COM
(July
18,
2012),
http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/132950-csi-style-super-resolution-imageenlargment-yeeaaaah [https://perma.cc/2H35-X2LY] (discussing the technology used in
crime shows and its achievability in real life).
225. MY COUSIN VINNY (20th Century Fox 1992).
226. See id. (Vinny Gambini: “Well, perhaps the laws of physics cease to exist on your
stove. Were these magic grits?”).
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own right. They can cause a finder of fact to ignore evidence that is
uncorroborated.227 As My Cousin Vinny shows, they could also
cause a finder of fact to make findings that do not reflect the true
probative value of the evidence.228 Thus, they are not the complete
answer to the question how we find accurate information about
what happened in international justice. Rather, they raise the next
question. To understand our desire to corroborate accounts—
shared by international jurists and viewers of crime dramas
alike—is to understand reasoning by inference. The move away
from stepping into the overtly politically laden confrontation of
blame, narrative, and alternative fact thus comes at a potentially
considerable cost. To appraise this cost—and potentials for
correction—is critically dependent upon a closer inspection of
proof by inference. So how does it work?
B. Inferences
Inferences are at the heart of proving facts in international
justice. Documents hardly ever tell the whole story. One could try
to close this gap with witness testimony, but international courts
and tribunals typically require corroboration for witness
testimony.229 This corroboration is based on some form of
inference that the direct witness evidence is credible and
probative.230 As already set out above, this means that
international justice uses corroboration—and thus inferences—as
the main tool to escape from the dilemma of political confrontation
and its descent into “alternative facts.”
However, the problem goes deeper than that. In many cases,
parties are unlikely to find witness evidence of the critical events
at the heart of their submissions. In those instances, a party will
have to argue for an inference from the record evidence they could
collect that a different event also must have taken place.
The Corfu Channel dispute is a good illustration of this larger
problem. The UK could not find a witness of the mine-laying for
obvious reasons of military secrecy (or if it could find one, the UK
227. See Tulip Real Estate Inv. & Dev. BV, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, at ¶ 149.
228. For a detailed account of the psychological mechanisms underlying overreliance
on eyewitness testimony see Heller, supra note 122, at 248.
229. See Section III.A.3, supra.
230. See Section III.A.3, supra.
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certainly did not proffer them).231 Instead, it submitted testimony
from a defector who witnessed the loading of mines onto Yugoslav
vessels and had access to the schedule upon which the vessels left
port and returned to port.232 On this basis, the UK asked for a
finding that Albania had permitted the Yugoslav navy to mine the
North Corfu straight.233 This finding would have been an inference.
This inference did not corroborate a witness’ testimony. Rather, it
asked for a finding of a fact for which there was no direct evidence
in the record, at all.
1. Inferences as Gap Fillers
Outside of the context of corroboration, inferences fill gaps.
Here, inferences work like the puzzle pieces discussed in the
context of corroboration. Suppose the record evidence provides an
incomplete picture of events. Rather than relying upon witness
testimony to fill in the gaps—and to fill them in a manner that the
rest of the evidence would corroborate—suppose the parties do
not submit further evidence as to what occurred.
In this context, a finder of fact would have two alternatives. It
could make a decision based upon burdens of proof. The party that
failed to provide some direct evidence would lose the case
precisely because there is a gap in the puzzle. Alternatively, the
finder of fact could permit the parties to make submissions of how
the finder of fact should fill out the remainder of the puzzle. In the
second scenario, the finder of fact would permit the parties to
prove facts by inference. As the discussion so far has already
shown, international justice has chosen the second path and
permits proof by inference.
International jurisprudence follows a five factor test in
proving facts by inference.234 In the first instance, the finder of fact
will establish the likelihood that the fact could have been proved
by direct evidence.235 If a party should have been able to prove a
fact by direct evidence but chose not to do so, finders of fact are far
more reluctant to make such a finding.236 At a minimum, finders of
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 8.
Id. at 12-17.
Id.
SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 295 (Evidentiary Principle § 28).
Id.
Id.
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fact will require an express or implicit explanation as to why the
party chose not to put forward direct evidence in support of its
case.237
Next, it is important to assess the probative value of the direct
evidence that has been proffered requesting an inference.238 Is the
fact on the basis of which the party requests an inference proved?
The firmer the footing of the facts surrounding the empty space on
the record, the more likely it is that these facts will be able to bear
the additional weight of an inference. Thus, in Corfu Channel, the
Court may have wondered whether LCdr Kovacic was a credible
witness and in fact saw ships loading mines etc.239 The inference
would only ever be warranted if the Court had believed the loading
of mines to have taken place.
Further, the length of the leap from the evidence to the
inference to be drawn needs to be assessed.240 If one puts together
a puzzle of Mickey Mouse, and all that is missing is a three-piece
cluster and Mickey Mouse only has one ear, it is not a significant
leap from the surrounding evidence to conclude that the missing
pieces pictured Mickey’s ear. Guessing what a missing three-piece
cluster of a Jackson Pollock puzzle would show may be significantly
more challenging.241 The closer the link between the inference and
the evidence, the more likely it is that a court or tribunal would
make the relevant finding of fact.
It is also important to consider how many pieces of evidence
independently support the drawing of the inference in question.242
Inference, in other words, can be corroborated by multiple pieces
of independent evidence. In the context of the puzzle analogy, the
more pieces of the puzzle one has assembled, the more likely one
can hazard a guess as to what is pictured in the empty space. Each
puzzle piece laid is additional support for the inference.

237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Corfu Channel, Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 16-17 (Apr. 9).
240. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 295.
241. See Roberta Smith, Drips, Dropped: Pollock and His Impact, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/01/arts/design/review-drips-droppedpollock-and-his-impact.html [https://perma.cc/B225-S4RV] (discussing Pollock’s
abstract expressionism and its impact).
242. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 295.
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A final factor is how significant the inference is to the case. 243
The more significant an inference, the more care a tribunal will
give to establishing the basis for drawing it.244 The less significant
an inference, the more willing a tribunal will be to draw inferences
from a relatively bare record.
These factors in drawing inferences are not elements. Rather,
they follow a typical factor test.245 They give the tribunal significant
discretion in approaching its fact-finding function.246 They also
mutually affect each other, meaning that it is not possible to isolate
the decision to draw or not to draw any one inference to
exclusively one factor.
2. The Threshold Question of Reasonableness
In drawing inferences, a tribunal first must answer a
threshold question: is the inference requested by a party
reasonable on its face? Classically, international law scholarship
submits that a court or tribunal draws an inference on the basis of
such reasonableness only.247
It is easy to imagine an inference that would on the whole be
unreasonable. For example, Yugoslavia had a navy in 1946.248 But
it would be unreasonable to conclude on the basis of this fact alone
that Yugoslavia used its navy to lay mines in the North Corfu
Straight in 1946. The submission has no further factual anchor and
resembles conspiracy theory and speculation rather than proof of
that speculation. Neither Yugoslavia nor Albania would have had
to rebut such evidence from the UK in the Corfu Channel case. It
would have been insufficient even to suggest the inference on its
face. There is a minimum floor of concreteness to draw an
243. Id.
244. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 17. See also Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic
Republic of Iran v. U.S.), Judgment 2003 I.C.J. 225, 234-35 (Sep. Op. Higgins).
245. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 295.
246. See Alapli Elektrik B.V. v. Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/13, Decision on
Annulment, ¶ 234 (July 10, 2014) (“What is more, a tribunal has considerable discretion
in its evaluation of the evidence.”).
247. MOJTABA KAZAZI, BURDEN OF PROOF AND RELATED ISSUES: A STUDY ON EVIDENCE
BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 259 (1996); SANDIFER, supra note 69, at 173.
248. Yugoslav Navy: Organization, Personnel, Installation, Ordnance, CENT.
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
1,
1
(Aug.
2,
1963),
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80T00246A0690004600015.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YFW-58XW].
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inference. International law deals with this floor in terms of
reasonableness.249
Although it is difficult to quantify the floor needed for the
drawing of a reasonable inference, the difference is on the whole
intuitive. It compares the inference to be drawn to our general
expectation of how the world (ought to) behave. It refers to basic
presumptions about how we expect the world to operate much like
the inference in Corfu Channel that it is reasonable for Albania to
have observed its strategic coast line, particularly when it
observed it diligently on other occasions thus closing the gap
between the inference and record fact considerably.250
In short, it requires that in the eyes of the tribunal, a party
satisfies each of the factors listed in the previous section. If there
were no other rebuttal evidence, could a court or tribunal draw an
inference in favor of the moving party without failing to provide
adequate reasons for its decision?
This reasonableness assessment does not operate in a
vacuum. Rather, it uses our general expectations of how the world
works, all things being equal. It measures the inference requested
against this general background understanding. If we ask a person
what the three missing puzzle cluster of the picture of our oneeared Mickey Mouse is likely to show, we tacitly assume that the
person has a seen a picture of Mickey Mouse before. As will be
discussed later on, this assessment thus makes necessary an
engagement with presumptions when making an initial
reasonableness assessment.
3. Plausibility—The Choice Between Reasonable Alternatives
In many scenarios, the problem is that there is more than one
reasonable inference one can draw from the evidence. To give an
everyday example, a parent is in the kitchen while a younger
brother, Michael, and his older sister, Josephine, are playing in the
den a room over. They are playing a game that involves a fight
between Lego figures. There is a thump. The younger brother cries.
The parent walks over and finds Michael sprawled crying on the
floor holding his leg. His sister Josephine stands over him, Lego
249. KAZAZI, supra note 247; SANDIFER, supra note 69.
250. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 18-20 (Apr. 9).
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figure in hand, shouting “bad Garmadon!” Did Josephine kick or
push Michael? The inference would be reasonable in light of the
typical brother-sister dynamics in a heated exchange that
developed out of a game. Or did Michael trip and fall? The inference
would also be reasonable in light of children’s occasional loss of
spatial awareness while playing with Legos. For the parent to
establish what happened, the parent will have to compare both
these reasonable inferences to each other.
The comparison of reasonable inferences is rarely made
express in international jurisprudence. It can however be observed
reasonably cleanly in the Croatian Genocide case.251 The
International Court of Justice there dealt with the question
whether Serbia had the requisite specific intent to commit
genocide of the Croatian population in the civil war following the
breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.252 Croatia submitted that this
intent could be inferred from the overall record, listing 17 specific
factual circumstances which supported the inference.253 Serbia
argued that it lacked specific genocidal intent towards the Croatian
population at issue in the case.254
The Court suggested that it would draw an inference of
specific genocidal intent if that intent was the only reasonable
inference from the record.255 The Court then examined the factual
circumstances submitted by Croatia. In examining these factual
circumstances, the Court found that in some instances, Serbian
forces had evacuated Croatian civilians from the heaviest scene of
fighting.256 This evacuation together with other similar factual
elements, the Court found, meant that genocidal intent was not the
only reasonable inference from the evidence before the Court.257
It is tempting to take the Court at its word: Croatia had not
overcome the high hurdle of disproving that an alternative
inference from the record evidence was also reasonable. This
conclusion does not fully do justice to what the Court found. The
Court’s analysis ultimately did not suggest that Serbia may have
251. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 119 (Feb. 3).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 119-20.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 128.
256. Id. at 127.
257. Id. at 127-28.
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acted with genocidal intent but that Croatia had failed to submit
sufficient evidence to rebut a reasonable inference that it had
not.258 Rather, the Court’s focus on the evacuation of the Croatian
population in particular suggests that the Court made a stronger
finding in Serbia’s favor: on the record before the Court, the Court
inferred that Serbia lacked the relevant intent.259
Following this chain of reasoning, the Court examined the
potential inferences it could draw against each other.260 It then
determined that one inference was more readily supported by the
evidence taken as a whole compared to the other.261 It thus
concluded that the plausible inference from the record was that
Serbia lacked the intent in question despite the fact that Croatia’s
submission of genocidal intent passed the initial reasonableness
screen for the drawing of inferences.262
This comparative approach to the drawing of inferences is
consistent with international arbitral jurisprudence, as well. That
jurisprudence is frequently asked to make determinations of facts
based on inferences when the tribunal is faced with multiple
reasonable proffered inferences from the parties.263 The
jurisprudence compares the strength of the inferences against
each other along.264 This jurisprudence, too, suggests that
international jurisprudence relies upon a plausibility analysis in

258. Croat. v. Serb., 2015 I.C.J. 119-28.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See, e.g., Rompetrol Grp. N.V. v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Award, ¶ 232
(May 6, 2013); Cambodia Power Co. v. Cambodia, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/18, Award, ¶¶
82–83, 94–95 (Mar. 22, 2011); Siag v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, ¶ 12 (June
1, 2009); Tokios Tokelès v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Award, ¶ 3 (June 29,
2007); Methanex Corp. v. U.S., UNCITRAL–NAFTA, Award, ¶¶ III.52–III.57 (Aug. 3,
2005); CDC Grp. Pub. Ltd. v. Republic of Seychelles, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14, Award, ¶¶
45–51 (Dec. 17, 2003); Feldman v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, ¶¶ 32–37
(Dec. 3, 2002) (dissenting opinion of Jorge Covarrubias Bravo).
264. See, e.g., Rompetrol Grp. N.V. v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Award, ¶ 232
(May 6, 2013); Cambodia Power Co. v. Cambodia, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/18, Award, ¶¶
82–83, 94–95 (Mar. 22, 2011); Siag v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, ¶ 12 (June
1, 2009); Tokios Tokelès v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Award, ¶ 3 (June 29,
2007); Methanex Corp. v. U.S., UNCITRAL–NAFTA, Award, ¶¶ III.52–III.57 (Aug. 3,
2005); CDC Grp. Pub. Ltd. v. Republic of Sey., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14, Award, ¶¶ 45–51
(Dec. 17, 2003); Feldman v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, ¶¶ 32–37 (Dec. 3,
2002) (dissenting opinion of Jorge Covarrubias Bravo).
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finding facts when faced with rival submissions regarding what
inferences the record supports.265
This plausibility analysis in one sense greatly advances the
quality of justice available before international courts and
tribunals. International courts and tribunals seek to approximate
to the best of their ability what happened on the ground.266 They
do not rely upon overly technical rules that would create greater
risks of mischaracterizing events. Inferences thus do not on their
face seek to distort fact finding in favor of the moving or the nonmoving party.
But the plausibility analysis highlights the blind spot of
inferences already discussed in the previous section. The
comparison of different inferences implicitly relies upon an
understanding of how the world operates, all things being equal, to
ascertain which inference is more probable in light of the record
evidence.267 This general understanding of how the world operates
already informs the threshold question whether a proffered
inference would reasonably be entailed by the record. This
analysis is not one of seeking to establish that the elements that an
inference is appropriate have been met. Rather, it is one that
engages the sound discretion and judgment of the finder of fact.
This component of judgment or discretion is further
heightened when a finder of fact is asked to compare how much
more reasonable one inference is when compared to another. This
exercise relies even more heavily upon the background
assumptions as to which inference deviates further from some
hypothetical default condition of everyday life. This background
condition informs how we can distinguish between reasonable
inferences when there is no discernible quantitative difference
between rival inferences along the test outlined in the previous
section. A plausibility analysis thus is only as strong as the
presumptions upon which it relies.

265. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 150-53.
266. Feldman, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1 at ¶ 36 (dissenting opinion of Jorge
Covarrubias Bravo).
267. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 152.
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C. Presumptions
If inferences are at the heart of fact finding in global justice,
presumptions are like the sinus node causing the heart to beat
according to a certain rhythm.268 Presumptions are deeply
embedded in the drawing of record inferences.269 At the same time,
presumptions themselves are a certain kind of non-record
inference that sets the conditions against which a court or tribunal
can make finding of facts from the record.270 As will be discussed
in detail in the next sections, presumptions establish general
expectations about how the world operates. These general
expectations about how the world operates are not of themselves
probative of anything. They become probative only if and when we
apply them to a specific dispute. Then, we compare how the
metaphorical puzzle pieces of a particular record measure up
against our general expectation of how the puzzle should be put
together or what the final puzzle should look like. Presumptions
thus constantly project over the unchartered territory of the
record evidence and help put it together into a map for resolving
the dispute.
As esoteric as the function of presumption may sound,
presumptions are nothing new or mysterious in the international
law of evidence. Rather, global dispute resolution has a robust
doctrinal framework for dealing with presumptions.271 This
doctrinal framework breaks presumptions into two different
kinds, legal presumptions and judicial presumptions.272 Before
delving more deeply into presumptions in their own right, this
section briefly introduces the doctrinal understanding of these two
kinds of presumptions.

268. Moinuddin Choudhury et al., Biology of the Sinus Node and its Disease, 4
ARRHYTHM ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY REV. 28, 28 (2015).
269. See supra Section III.B (inferences); infra Section III.C.2 (application to
presumptions).
270. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 117.
271. Id. at 111-34; KOLB, supra note 69, at 241-43; SANDIFER, supra note 69, at 142;
Principle XII.3, TRANS-LEX.ORG, https://www.trans-lex.org/968000 (last visited Sept. 10,
2020).
272. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 111-34; KOLB, supra note 69, at 241-43.
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1. Legal Presumptions as Part of Applicable Law
Legal presumptions are the most straightforward way in
which presumption overlay the fact-finding process. Legal
presumptions are part of the applicable law.273 A legal
presumption is a rule of applicable law that requires a
decisionmaker to use a certain rubric when approaching the
record.274
Due to its television fame, one of the most commonly known
legal presumption is the presumption of innocence in criminal
proceedings.275 The presumption of innocence in the US context is
a rule of evidence or proof founded in the constitutional principle
of due process.276 It requires that the finder of fact in a criminal
trial assess the evidence with the assumption of the accused’s
innocence.277 The presumption of innocence thus applies by
constitutional mandate to US criminal trials, in theory, at least.278
To ignore it would be to violate the defendant’s constitutional
rights in a way analogous to permitting evidence to be introduced
against a criminal defendant in violation of the Confrontation
Clause of the US Constitution.279
Although the issue has been debated, general international
law recognizes certain kinds of legal presumptions.280 For instance,
general international law presumes that state law and specialized
international law is consistent with general international law.281
General international law also presumes that state conduct such as
273. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 111-34; KOLB, supra note 69, at 241-43.
274. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 293.
275. David G. Post, Nelson v. Colorado: New Life for an Old Idea?, CATO SUP. CT. REV.,
2016-2017, at 205, 215.
276. See Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J.
723 passim (2011) (arguing for a more robust due process reading of the presumption).
277. Post, supra note 275, at 217.
278. See Baradaran, supra note 276, at 754-65 (discussing the limitations of the
presumption in the criminal procedure setting and its roots in constitutional
misunderstanding).
279. Pamela R. Metzger, Confrontation as a Rule of Production, 24 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 995, 1037 (2016); François Quintard-Morénas, The Presumption of Innocence in the
French and Anglo-American Legal Traditions, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 107, 140-41 (2010).
280. See ANNA RIDDELL & BRANDAN PLANT, EVIDENCE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE 102 (2009) (questioning existence of legal presumptions). But see Kolb, supra
note 69, at 944 (confirming the presence of legal presumptions in general international
law).
281. HEEJIN KIM, REGIME ACCOMMODATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND POLICY 35 (2016).
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the passing of legislation or the use of executive power is valid.282
These presumptions organize the manner in which an
international law fact finder will interpret the state law or
governmental decisions in question.283 However, it radiates more
broadly in how the international finder of fact organizes other
record facts that are dependent upon the law or decision—that is,
how it will organize its appraisal of the implementation of law or
the carrying out of a decision in a specific dispute by requiring that
the pieces of the factual puzzle be put together on the assumption
that the underlying legislation comported with international law
and was domestically valid.
As a default matter, legal presumptions are rebuttable.284 A
party can introduce evidence to show that the presumption is
inapplicable in the case at bar.285 This means that factual findings
do not always follow the default rules of legal presumptions.286 It
also means that the rubric through which a finder of fact engages
the record remains flexible even in the face of legal presumptions.
However, the existence of legal presumptions creates a significant
obstacle for any party wishing for a court or tribunal to depart from
them. As the presumption of innocence shows, this obstacle is not
fatal—plenty of criminal defendants are ultimately convicted,287
but as the presumption of innocence also shows, it is a significant
obstacle nonetheless.288
2. Judicial Presumptions Based on Relevant Practice
Judicial presumptions are less straight forward than legal
presumptions. Unlike legal presumptions, they are not the result of
the application of specific legal mandate from the applicable law.

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

CHENG, supra note 12, at 305.
KIM, supra note 281, at 35; CHENG, supra note 12, at 305.
SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 123-24.
Id.
Id.
What is the Probability of Conviction for Criminal Defendants?, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?iid=403&ty=qa [https://perma.cc/K6XSMYYV] (last visited Sept. 9, 2020) (summarizing US federal conviction rates).
288. See id.; see also James Q. Whitman, Presumption of Innocence or Presumption of
Mercy?: Weighing Two Western Modes of Justice, 94 TEX. L. REV. 933, passim (2016)
(discussing the function of the presumption of innocence from a comparative perspective).

2020]

TRUTHS IN TRANSLATION

149

Instead, they apply the general inductive principle that one should
expect the record to follow the pattern of general practice.289
One of the most mundane codifications of judicial
presumptions is the US Federal Rule of Evidence governing habit
evidence.290 The rule permits a party to plead that on a particular
occasion, a person acted consistently with a habit despite the fact
that there is no evidence whatsoever to corroborate that the
person acted consistently with their habit on the particular
occasion.291 The rule requires proof of the habit itself.292 A party
satisfies this requirement when it can show that a person has a
frequent, consistent response to the same specific stimulus.293
The point of proof of a fact by habit is that one can substitute
the proof of a specific contested fact (“A did B in response to C on
day X”) with proof of a different factual predicate: A did B in
response to C on all days D to W on which A was exposed to C.294
Although we do not have proof of A’s action on day X, we can
substitute the consistency of practice from other contexts to stand
in for an unknown.
International law permits a similar kind of proof by means of
judicial presumptions.295 Judicial presumptions require proof of a
general pattern of conduct by like-situated parties akin to a usage
of trade.296 It must then place the party to whom the conduct will
be attributed within that general pattern.297 Once that has been
done, the proof of the general conduct or practice will create a
presumption that the person in question acted consistently with
the general pattern or practice on the occasion in question even if
there is no other proof to that effect.298
The effect of this judicial presumption is that the record is
appraised consistently with such habit. In some instances, there
289. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 117-21.
290. FED R. EVID. 406.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Barrett J. Anderson, Recognizing Character: A New Perspective on Character
Evidence, 121 YALE L.J. 1912, 1916 n.10 (2012).
294. See Reyes v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 589 F.2d 791, 795 (5th Cir. 1979) (setting out the
regularity requirement in FED. R. EVID. 406).
295. See ROBERT KOLB, THE ELGAR COMPANION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
241 (2014) (presumptions of facts or praesumptiones hominis).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
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will be genuinely no proof concerning a specific fact. At that point,
the judicial presumption steps out into the open. The Burlington
Resources Inc. v. Ecuador arbitration presents an example of such a
use of a judicial presumption.299 The case arose out of an oil and
gas project in Ecuador.300 The project involved an operator in
charge of the day-to-day operations of the oil and gas project as
well as “non-operators,” who contribute money and know-how to
the project but do not control day-to-day operations.301 One of the
contested issues in the arbitration was whether the non-operators
had communicated with the government in a satisfactory
manner.302 The non-operators relied upon a letter sent by the
operator to the government.303 They proved up that as a trade
usage in the oil and gas industry, the operator communicates on
behalf of all project participants.304 In this case, there was no other
evidence whether the operator was speaking on behalf of itself
alone in this instance or for the project as a whole.305 The
presumption therefore provided a fact by proof of the broader
industry practice and proof that the project participants fit in that
practice.
However, as with legal presumptions, the judicial
presumption also operates in the background to organize record
material. It provides the rubric against which inferences are tested
and puzzle pieces put together. Judicial presumptions, in other
words, are a powerful organizing tool for fact finding even when
they are not directly employed. The Kim v. Uzbekistan arbitration
is an example of how judicial presumptions can fulfill such a role—
and be ultimately dispositive of a core issue in the case.306
Relevantly, Uzbekistan submitted in the arbitration that the
299. Burlington Resources Inc. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 326-29 (June 2, 2010).
300. Id.
301. See id.; see also DAVID E. PIERCE, TRANSACTIONAL EVOLUTION OF OPERATING
AGREEMENTS IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 16 (2008) (discussing operating agreements in
the oil and gas industry).
302. See Burlington Resources Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5 at ¶¶ 326–329.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. (discussing the evidence of the letter and earlier proceedings in which
Respondent appeared to treat the operator as speaking for the project rather than just
itself as evidence of this general practice applying in the case).
306. Kim v. Republic of Uzb., ICSID Case No. ARB/13/6, Decision on Jurisdiction (Mar.
8, 2017).
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tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the dispute because the claimants
had acquired their investment through corruption.307 Proof of
corruption would indeed have divested the tribunal of jurisdiction
under the relevant consent instrument.308
The case ultimately boiled down to a fight between judicial
presumptions. Uzbekistan lacked direct evidence of corruption.309
Uzbekistan instead relied upon red flags in the investment
structure.310 Particularly, Uzbekistan submitted that convoluted
and complex aspects of the acquisition of the investment by
claimants raised such red flags.311 To substantiate why this
structuring raised red flags, Uzbekistan looked to indicia of
corruption in general arbitral jurisprudence.312 The claimants, on
the other hand, argued that “[t]he presence of many corporate
layers are elements commonly seen in transactions in the CIS
region.”313 In essence, claimants made an argument that their
investment structuring should benefit from “green flags” because
their structuring mirrored that of industry practice in the
region.314
The tribunal ultimately resolved the case against Uzbekistan
because Uzbekistan had failed to establish “the link between the
advantage bestowed and the improper advantage obtained.”315 It
went on to state “[t]he casting of doubt or aspersions as to the
probity of a transaction is not sufficient.”316 In effect, the evidence
of red flags and conduct consistent with the red flags was merely a
“casting of doubt or aspersions.”317 This insufficiency was not
purely that there was no direct proof of a quid quo pro (this would
hardly ever be possible).318 The question rather was whether the
307. Id. at ¶ 543.
308. Id.
309. Id. at ¶ 548.
310. See id. at ¶ 546.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Kim, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/6, ¶ 547.
314. Id.
315. Id. at ¶ 589 (quoting Sistem Mühendislik İnşaat Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. v. Kyrgyz
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/06/1, Judgment, ¶ 43 (Sept. 9, 2009).
316. Kim, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/6 at ¶ 589.
317. Id.
318. See ALOYSISUS LLAMZON, CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
194-98 (2014) (discussing the jurisdictional jurisprudence addressing corruption
allegations).
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tribunal accepted the alternative explanation for the record
evidence as consistent with the general business practice pled by
the claimants.319 In other words, the Kim claimants won the judicial
presumption battle. The tribunal examined the evidence through
the lens of, and organized it consistent with the “green flags”
submitted by claimants, not the “red flags” submitted by
Uzbekistan.
As with legal presumptions, judicial presumptions are
rebuttable.320 A party can introduce evidence to show that the
presumption is inapplicable in the case at bar.321 This means that
factual findings do not always follow the default rules of judicial
presumptions, either.322 Despite this, the obstacle created by
judicial presumptions in some respects can be harder to overcome
than legal presumptions. The stronger the evidence of a judicial
presumption the more the finder of fact will be locked in to a path
dependent perspective in appraising the record.323 Path
dependence is a difficult thing to overcome.324 It is precisely for
this reason that much of the work of advocates is to convince the
finder of fact that a dispute at bar fits into a pattern for which the
finder of fact has a ready rubric to hand.
IV. PRESUMPTIONS’ BIAS PROBLEM
The discussion in the previous three Parts of this Article
demonstrate that presumptions are central to the fact-finding
process. Presumptions supply facts where the record otherwise
would not yield them and thus avoids or modifies the otherwise
strict applications of burdens of proof. Further, presumptions also
organize the manner in which we must approach the necessarily
incomplete pieces of a factual record to put the puzzle of the case
back together. The power of presumptions is that they allow a
decisionmaker to attempt to do material justice even in the context
of imperfect information. Given the stakes in international justice,
319. See id.
320. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 120-21.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. See Oona Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 626-27 (2001) (discussing
path dependence).
324. Id. at 643-44 (discussing how rarely path dependence can be overcome).
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the need to make decisions in the face of imperfect information is
by no means an accident. As the Corfu Channel case showcased, it
is an inherent feature of the sensitive questions that international
judges and arbitrators are asked to resolve.325
However, the power of a presumption is also its Achilles heel.
Presumptions operate as more or less articulated assumptions.
These assumptions establish facts central to international disputes
on the basis of what ought to be the case. Presumptions in other
words encounter a classic moral problem in reverse: moral
philosophy since the time of 18th century Scotsman,
enlightenment bugbear, and common-sense apostle, David Hume,
had an is-ought problem “that an ‘ought’ cannot be derived from an
‘is.’”326 Presumptions seek to infer an is (what actually happened)
from an ought (what was supposed to have happened) and thus
encounter the same inferential problem. This reverse is-ought
problem reveals latent powerful biases in the international law of
evidence that must be addressed lest the international rule of law
falls victim to creating its own “alternative facts” rather than
seeking to establish a more objective basis for decision.
To put it bluntly, what seemed like the potential antidote to
anxiety mongering in post-truth discourse now appears to be
headed into precisely the same direction as post-truth
discourse.327 Rule of law, too, mandates that facts be established
within the frame of Rules for Radicals’ “experience of your own
people.”328 To unpack this statement, rule of law has a “people”
whose experience becomes paramount: its liberal champions.329
Liberal champions of rule of law thus become a competitor for and
in policy space rather than fair regulators of that space.330 Rule of
law itself becomes political.331 Populist leaders from Vladimir Putin
325. Corfu Channel, Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 16-18 (Apr. 9).
326. Geoff Sayre-McCord, Metaethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 26, 2012),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaethics/#IsOOpeQueArg
[https://perma.cc/W4GY-ZHBE].
327. REISMAN, supra note 131, at 67.
328. ALINSKY, supra note 128, at 127
329. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Dark Side of the Relationship Between the Rule of Law
and Liberalism, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 516, 517 (2008) ("The rule of law, liberalism, and
democracy are often thought to make a happy triumvirate”). Tamanaha goes on to critique
this traditional understanding of the relationship between democracy on the one hand and
rule of law and liberalism on the other. Id. at passim.
330. See id. at 543-47.
331. SCHMITT, supra note 187.

154

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:1

of Russia to President Donald Trump have attacked rule-of-law
liberalism in those terms.332 As Francis Fukuyama points out, this
populo-nationalist attack is nothing new: German protonationalists like Paul de Lagarde accused liberalism (and its rule of
law rationalism) as causing the decay of national community and
national identity on similar grounds.333 The critique of
presumptions thus radiates beyond “simple” rules of evidence. It
affects if the rule of law is a competitor for how world society
constructs its own reality or if it can be a means to mediate
between competitors in a fair and even-handed manner.
A. The Theoretical Foundation of Presumptions
A full understanding of the theoretical problem posed by
presumptions requires an inquiry into their theoretical
foundations. The doctrinal baseline for presumptions in all forms
of international justice is the principle of good faith.334 The baseline
assumption was first articulated in international law.335 It has since
been adopted in disputes between states and non-state actors and
in transnational commercial disputes.336
International courts and tribunals look to the principle of
good faith as a default rule of decision.337 All else being equal, the
parties are assumed to have acted in good faith.338 In other words,
it must be proven that the parties acted with less than good faith.339
This rule supplements the use of burdens of proof: a party can
sustain its burden of proof even in the absence of positive evidence
as to what occurred.340 All it must do is show that the allegation by
the party opponent would assume bad faith on the part of the
moving party.341 In the absence of factual evidence either way, the

332. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, IDENTITY: THE DEMAND FOR DIGNITY AND THE POLITICS OF
RESENTMENT 9, 158-9 (2018).
333. Id. at 65-66, 70.
334. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 117.
335. See CHENG, supra note 12, at 106 (“Contracting parties are always assumed to be
acting honestly and in good faith.”).
336. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 117; TRANS-LEX.ORG, supra note 271.
337. See CHENG, supra note 12, at 106.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. See id.
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moving party can then rest on the assumption that it would have
acted in good faith.342
The Corfu Channel case discussed throughout the Article is
one example of this use of good faith presumptions in action. The
International Court of Justice in Corfu Channel refused to conclude
that Albania colluded with Yugoslavia to mine the Corfu straights
in the absence of positive proof to that effect. 343 It did so because
such collusion would be bad faith—it would be tantamount to an
admission of a violation of the law of innocent passage.344 At the
same time, the Court ruled that Albania would be well aware of the
laying of mines by third parties in its strategic waterways and
therefore would have been able to warn third parties about the
presence of the mines.345 It imputed actual knowledge of the mines
from the general practice of states to observe their strategic
waterways together with past evidence that Albania had acted
consistently with this practice on previous occasions.346
To ground presumptions in good faith means that
presumptions can be divided into the two familiar elements of
good faith.347 The first element of good faith is parties act with
honesty in fact.348 Consequently, when good faith becomes the
basis for a presumption, it leads the decisionmaker to assume that
the party invoking the presumption acted with honesty in fact.349
This means that the decisionmaker will assume that motives of
that party are pure of heart rather than malicious.350 And the
decisionmaker will also assume that the contemporaneous
representations made by the party are truthful rather than
fraudulent.351

342. See id.
343. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 16-18 (Apr. 9).
344. Id.
345. Id. at 18-20.
346. Id.
347. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 117.
348. Id.
349. See CHENG, supra note 12, at 106; HICEE B.V. v. Slovk., PCA Case Repository No.
2009-11, Partial Award, ¶ 129 (May 23, 2011); ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Hung., ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/16, Award, ¶ 475 (Oct. 2, 2006); Gemplus S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/04/2, Award, ¶ 4-142 (June 16, 2010).
350. See CHENG, supra note 12, at 106; HICEE B.V., PCA Case Repository No. 2009-11
at ¶ 129; ADC Affiliate Ltd, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16 at ¶ 475.
351. Gemplus S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/2 at ¶ 4-142.
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The second element of good faith is reasonableness.352
Consequently, when good faith becomes the basis for a
presumption, it leads the decisionmaker to assume that the party
invoking the presumption acted reasonably.353 This means that the
decisionmaker will assume that the party invoking the
presumption acted consistently with applicable custom or
practice.354 In other words, it will substitute proof of the practice
itself and proof of general adherence by the invoking party with
the practice for proof that the practice was followed in the specific
instance at bar.
This use of good faith as the basis for presumptions creates a
potential problem. It logically requires the decisionmaker to take
sides before hearing the evidence. The actor’s good faith is
presumed. This entails that the audience’s or “victim’s” perspective
is discounted. There is no record basis for this choice. Yet, it is
frequently dispositive of core disputed factual questions.
In international law, it means that states are presumed to have
acted in accordance with general expectations of states in similar
circumstances.355 This risks discounting the perspective of states
in similar position to the audience or victim states (consider a
dispute between a nuclear weapon state such as North Korea and
a non-nuclear weapon state such Japan regarding nuclear weapons
tests). In transnational commercial law, companies are presumed
to have acted in accordance with trade practice in their respective
trade, accounting for size, place and industry.356 This presumption
risks discounting the perspective of their trading partners if these
partners are smaller, from a different place, or industry. Investorstate arbitration showcases this risk with even greater clarity as it
risks discounting the perspective of the state regarding investor
conduct and vice versa.357
352. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 117.
353. Micula v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Award, ¶ 673 (Dec. 11, 2013); Phx.
Action Ltd. v. Czech, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, ¶ 127 (Apr. 15, 2009); CDC Grp. Ltd.
v. Republic of Sey., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14, Award, ¶ 47 (Dec. 17, 2003); BRIDAS SAPIC
v. Turkm., Case No. 9058/FMS/KGA, Partial Award, ¶ 139, n.13 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb. 1999).
354. See supra note 352.
355. CHENG, supra note 12, at 107.
356. Compare TRANS-LEX.ORG, supra note 271 (governing presumptions) with
Principle
I.1.1(b),
TRANS-LEX.ORG,
https://www.trans-lex.org/901000
[https://perma.cc/F9F6-LFUN] (last visited Sept. 10, 2020) (codifying context-sensitive
good faith obligations).
357. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 117-20.

2020]

TRUTHS IN TRANSLATION

157

This theoretical basis of presumptions thus provides a more
nuanced explanation why the Kim v. Uzbekistan tribunal chose its
presumptions according to which it resolved the dispute as it did.
Uzbekistan asked the Kim tribunal to find that the investor had
acted in a corrupt manner.358 This conclusion concerned the
actions of a commercial party.359 The presumption of good faith
defaults to the relevant practice of the acting party—that is the
commercial party. As the Kim claimants could show that there was
an innocuous trade practice to structure investments in
Uzbekistan in a manner similar to the way that the Kim claimants
had done, the Kim claimants received the benefit of the
presumption.360 The Kim claimants received the benefit of the
presumption despite the fact that from the state’s perspective, the
evidence was similarly consistent with the perception of
corruption.361 Presumptions bring about this result because the
state was not the actor and its perspective therefore is ultimately
not material.362
B. Presumptions as Narrative
It should be reasonably straight forward that this use of good
faith in presumptions will lead to problems. It is not a compelled
conclusion that good faith must favor the actor’s perspective. An
analogy to the law of contracts readily shows why. A fictional law
professor might tell her class “whoever of you dunces can answer
my next question correctly gets an A in my class.” A fictional law
student could rise to the challenge and correctly answer the
question. Did the law professor make an offer or did she tell a joke?
This question critically depends upon perspective. From the
perspective of most (non-fictional) law professors, it is fair to
assume that the statement is a joke. But when the author offered
the statement as a hypothetical question after teaching Lucy v.
Zehmer to introduce some levity into class discussion, all students
generally considered the statement to be a serious offer (and for

358. Kim v. Republic of Uzb., ICSID Case No. ARB/13/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶
546 (Mar. 8, 2017).
359. Id.
360. Id. at ¶ 547.
361. Id. at ¶ 589.
362. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 117-20.
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that matter, not very funny).363 Speaker’s meaning and audience
meaning diverge on the critical question of what happened.
Lucy v. Zehmer classically sides with the ordinary meaning of
the audience of a statement.364 The Restatement (Second) of
Contract makes this link explicit when it deems a manifestation of
willingness to be an offer when it is “so made as to justify another
person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited
and will conclude it.”365 The US common law of contracts as
summarized in the Restatement would thus conclude that our
fictitious law professor was serious and did not make a joke.
Problematically, if one analyzes the same hypothetical
through the lens of presumptions at work in international dispute
resolution one arrives at the opposite result. There is no additional
record evidence to determine whether the fictitious law professor
was joking. This means that the fictitious law professor could
invoke a presumption. That presumption would look to other
similarly situated actors as a frame of reference.366 Our example
posits that law professors, unlike law students, would have
understood the statement as a joke. Because the focus of the
presumption analysis is on the actor, the statement would
therefore be treated as a joke.
Tellingly, both regimes seek to reduce what happened to a
similar frame of refence: reasonableness. The objective theory of
mutual assent informing the US common law of contracts looks to
establish what a reasonable person in the position of the offeree
would have understood.367 The force of the objective theory is
factual—it assumes that it is more likely to arrive at the true ex ante
expectations of the parties.368 This understanding of
reasonableness and correctness is frequently coupled with a latent
reference to good faith.369 The theory underlying presumptions
363. See Lucy v. Zehmer, 196 Va. 493 (1954).
364. Id. at 502.
365. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (emphasis
added).
366. See supra note 353.
367. See Lawrence M. Solan, Contract as Agreement, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 353, 401
(2007) (discussing Justice Cardozo’s contract jurisprudence and “the ex ante intent of the
contracting parties”).
368. Id.
369. See id. (noting the link between the ordinary meaning and good faith
jurisprudence).
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similarly looks to reasonableness as its benchmark.370
Presumptions are clearly a result of the principle of good faith,371
and assume that it is more likely than the alternative to arrive at
the true contemporaneous understanding of the events at bar.372
This means that the difference in result cannot be explained away
simply by the different legal contexts in which the different results
arise. Both legal contexts intend to do the same thing—reach the
reasonable result—but then reach the exact opposite result.
How is this possible? The use of good faith and
reasonableness in both contexts ultimately reduces the question of
what happened to one of narrative. What happened is not a
question of establishing something about the “real world.” In both
instances, the ultimate determination of whether the law professor
joked or not is “constructed” to justify and compel a certain result
(in this case, the result would be whether the student answering
the question should receive an A).373 We achieve this result by
super-imposing discursive conventions over the world as we
cannot learn more about the world itself.374 This means we are
ultimately asking a different question. We did not seek to establish
whether the law professor actually joked. Nor did we seek to
establish if the student answering the law professor’s question
actually thought he or she would receive an A in the class. Instead
we seek to superimpose a uniform objective matrix over the
evidence to draw a conclusion as to how a legal dispute should be
decided.375
This objective matrix can be threateningly circular. The
presumption that the parties acted in good faith overlaps with the
obligation that the parties ought to treat each other with good faith.
International law imposes an obligation upon states to act honestly
in fact and to act reasonably.376 Transnational commercial law
imposes much the same obligation for commercial actors.377 In
both cases reasonableness is construed against the same
370. See infra note 353.
371. Id.
372. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 117-20.
373. JACQUES DERRIDA, DE LA GRAMMATOLOGIE 54-55 (1967).
374. Id.
375. JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SIMULCRA AND SIMULATIONS 7 (1994).
376. CHENG, supra note 12, at 105-62.
377. Principle
I.1.1,
TRANS-LEX.ORG,
https://www.trans-lex.org/901000
[https://perma.cc/F9F6-LFUN] (last visited Sept. 10, 2020).
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background condition of uniformity with general practice of like
situated actors that is at work in the use of presumptions.378 What
is and what ought to be thus overlap.
Factual findings premised in a presumption of good faith
construct events out of evaluative claims. Good faith is a normative
concept rather than descriptive one. To state that a party acted in
good faith is to evaluate conduct. To state that a party acted in bad
faith is to blame that party for wrongdoing. To assume that a party
acted in good faith thus constructs facts from a source external to
the events.
This use of presumptions again runs into a version of the isought problem.379 The is-ought problem submits that there is a
difference in kind between descriptive statements and evaluative
statements.380 Evaluative statements are premised upon norms.381
These norms cannot be derived from facts alone.382 They require
an ulterior source standing behind facts.383 For example, one may
observe that Romans eat fish on Friday. This would be a descriptive
statement. This statement becomes evaluative or normative when
coupled with the command “when in Rome, do as the Romans.”
This norm—act uniformly—is not a factual description. It requires
external validation.
By way of analogy, it is again instructive to look to US contract
law. Early efforts by Karl Llewellyn to codify the US commercial
law in the Uniform Commercial Code faced headwind with regard
to the definition of the obligation to treat contractual
counterparties with good faith.384 Karl Llewellyn sought to
introduce an obligation into the Uniform Commercial Code that
merchants treat each other according to the reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.385 This part of
378. CHENG, supra note 12, at 134-36; TRANS-LEX.ORG, supra note 377.
379. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469-70 (P.H. Nidditch ed., 2d ed.
1978).
380. Id.
381. See Rachel Cohon, Hume’s Moral Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA MORAL PHIL.
(Aug.
20,
2018),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/#io
[https://perma.cc/YDC3-DFDC] (outlining the different interpretations of the problem in
light of evaluative/ normative and descriptive statements).
382. HUME, supra note 379, at 455-70.
383. Id.
384. Peter Winship, Jurisprudence and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Commote, 31
SW. L.J. 843, 856 (1977).
385. Id. at 855.
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the implied covenant of good faith codified the reasonableness
requirement is akin to the statement “when in Rome, do as the
Romans.”386 Llewellyn’s efforts failed.387 The American Bar
Association’s Section on Corporation, Banking and Business law
resisted inclusion of the reasonableness requirement insisting that
there only be a good faith obligation to act with honesty in fact.388
This episode highlights that uniformity of conduct does not create
an obligation of its own accord. If that had been the case, the
objection of the American Bar Association would have been
defeated as absurd when it was made. Instead, it took until the
2001 revisions to the Uniform Commercial Code that reasonable
standards in the trade in fact create an obligation of fair dealing as
part of the general definition of good faith in Article 1 of the
Code.389
Presumptions run into the is-ought problem in reverse.
Presumptions are grounded in the principle of good faith.390 The
principle of good faith is a legal command as to how an actor ought
to behave.391 Presumptions deploy this principle to establish how
the actor did behave.392 Presumptions infer an “is” from an “ought.”
Transnational commercial practice shows why this could well be a
problem. Good faith in global commerce relies heavily upon selfregulation.393 International merchants and their lawyers establish
between themselves what best practices they ought to follow when
doing international business.394 These best practices then mature
through adoption into a kind of running code for the global
business community.395
One need not be too hard-nosed of a realist to understand that
such transnational commercial practices are frequently
386. Id.
387. Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code: 1940-49,
51 SMU L. REV. 275, 280 (1998).
388. Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L.J.
619, 623 (1981).
389. Margaret L. Moses, The New Definition of Good Faith in Revised Article 1, 35 UCC
L.J. 47, 47 (2002).
390. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 117-20.
391. CHENG, supra note 12, at 134-36; TRANS-LEX.ORG, supra note 377.
392. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 117-20.
393. KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE NEW LEX MERCATORIA 4446, (2d ed. 2010).
394. Id.
395. Id.
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aspirational. They are expressions of intent. As such they are
meaningful normative yardsticks. They express a desire and
consent to act according to such a set of agreed upon norms.396
However, this desire or consent does not always overlap with
realities on the ground: the best practices harden into norms
because parties include best practices into contracts with fellow
merchants as obligations.397 Needless to say, such an inclusion
would not be needed if the parties already could be depended upon
to act consistently with the best practices in the ordinary course;
by way of example, form contracts do not require business people
to own a computer even when notices can be given by email. Such
rudimentary facts of life—important as they may be—are
assumed. Compliance with best practice is another matter.398 This
makes commercial good faith obligations a dangerous tool to
establish what a particular commercial party did on a particular
occasion. Best practices, uncharitably, may very well resemble
New Year’s resolutions. They express a sincere desire to act. Yet, to
find out whether a person ran on July 4 of a given year, it would be
dangerous to look to their new year’s resolution to run every day.
We can now see the “reverse is-ought problem” underlying
the application of presumptions. They project the self-regulatory
intentions of states and commercial actors to determine that they
in fact acted consistently with their aspirations. They thus base
factual findings in a narrative of voluntary compliance with selfregulatory pronouncements. This premise is a “narrative” in the
sense that it creates an arc from best intention to best practice to
actual practice. It tells the story we wished were true about us.
Needless to say, the underlying normative aspirations rarely are
fully realized.
C. The Bias Problem—How to Test Narratives?
The currently prevalent use of presumptions has a bias
problem. As discussed in the last section, presumptions are
premised in narratives. These narratives presuppose that actions
in particular instances comport with normatively grounded
expectations of how actors ought to act. This use of narratives is
396. Id.
397. Id. at 44.
398. Id.
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not premised in a descriptive frame of reference but instead
imports a normative frame of reference to establish what actually
happened in a given case.
The choice of perspective from which to construct the
presumptions now becomes acutely problematic. It determines
whose narrative governs the fact-finding process. As we have seen
in the context of the Kim v. Uzbekistan example, the choice of
perspective focuses on the actor to whom the presumption would
be applied rather than on its counter-party.399 It creates
presumptions premised upon how the actor’s own immediate
environment reconstructs its own aspirations and translates these
aspirations into cognizable best-practice efforts.400 It therefore
anchors what happened in the frame of reference of the very
person whose conduct is at issue.
This choice of perspective uncritically adopts the biases of the
party whose conduct is at issue. Self-regulatory processes
appropriately begin from the shared cognitive baselines between
actors participating in them.401 These shared cognitive baselines
rationalize a set of behavior in accordance with the evaluative
aspirations of the group.402 These aspirations are an appropriate
yardstick between the participants in the process. As participants
in the process, they share the same authoritative expectations.
The problem is that these self-regulatory expectations are
used as a means to construct facts in disputes with outsiders. This
is most clearly the case in proceedings like the Kim arbitration.403
These proceedings involve states and commercial parties.
However, they rely upon the in-group’s assessment of its own
conduct as a basis for factual determination despite the fact that
the out-group has not participated in its self-regulatory processes
and does not share the underlying authoritative expectations
giving rise to them. Commercial parties have a very different view
whether government agencies act capriciously than the
government agencies themselves. Moreover, government agencies
399. Kim v. Republic of Uzb., ICSID Case No. ARB/13/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶
546 (Mar. 8, 2017).
400. BERGER, supra note 393, at 44-46, 285-92.
401. Id.
402. See GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS RUNNING CODE A
THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 125 (2012).
403. See Kim, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/6 at ¶ 546.
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may have similar misgivings about “corporate greed.” Yet, these
differences in perspectives are silently glossed over.
The problem is not limited to such hybrid proceedings. They
can similarly arise in the context of state-to-state proceedings. To
begin with, these proceedings themselves may take on a hybrid
character such as when states espouse the claims of their
nationals.404 Yet, even in classic state-to-state claims, narratives
too frequently build up. Events such as the Cuban missile crisis
have demonstrated how such narratives almost led to nuclear
war.405 Events like the aftermath of the assassination of Arch-Duke
Franz-Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914 further demonstrate how
narratives can lead Great Powers to enter into a world war.406
The use of presumptions thus risks organizing materials
according to a matrix of alternative facts.407 Alternative facts at
heart are descriptive claims that are premised in narrative-driven
normative demands.408 The claim by President Trump regarding
the size of the crowd witnessing his inauguration is such an
alternative fact.409 It is premised in the normative demand of
legitimacy.410 The narrative of legitimacy demands supporters.
This narrative thus constructs the descriptive claim of large
inauguration crowds.
More to the point, the “Rules for Radicals” approach to
politicized discourse requires that discourse be placed in the
context of the experience of one’s own people to the exclusion of
the opponent.411 Rules for Radicals type-manuals thus uses an
approach to narrative-based discourse that refuses to yield the
404. See Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), 2010 I.C.J.
Rep. 639, ¶ 58 (Nov. 30).
405. THE KENNEDY TAPES: INSIDE THE WHITE HOUSE DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
387-88 (Ernest May & Philip Zelikow eds., 2002).
406. CHRISTOPHER CLARK, SLEEPWALKER: HOW EUROPE WENT TO WAR IN 1914 560-62
(2012).
407. Strong, supra note 2, at 137-39; Julie Beck, This Article Won’t Change Your Mind,
The Facts on Why Facts Alone Can’t Fight False Beliefs, ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/03/this-article-wont-change-yourmind/519093/ [https://perma.cc/M8M9-K4JQ].
408. See Strong, supra note 2 at 137-39. See also Beck, supra note 407.
409. See Jim Rutenberg, ‘Alternative Facts’ and the Costs of Trump-Branded Reality,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
22,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/22/business/media/alternative-facts-trumpbrand.html [https://perma.cc/U5W9-RY9G].
410. Strong, supra note 2, at 137-39.
411. ALINSKY, supra note 128, at 127.
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frame for appraisal and construction of what counts as “facts.” It is
this radicalization which ultimately underlies the us/them
dynamic of the post-truth syndrome—“we” becomes the arbiter of
truth by anchoring valid statements in a shared—and intentionally
weaponized—sense of community and communal narrative.412
The problem of presumptions is that they risk operating in the
same manner. If one is not careful, the use of presumptions anchors
the construction of facts in the narratives of the very people pacific
dispute resolutions needs to police. These narratives similarly are
premised in normative demands. Thus, states frequently make the
normative demand that they do not torture dissidents.413
International dispute resolution processes, and by extension the
international rule of law which relies upon them, frequently
construct facts on the basis of descriptive claims consistent with
this demand by sweeping such allegations under the rug or
treating them as uncorroborated.414 Presumptions thus are
powerful tools to resolve disputes—but they are a tool that can
come at cost: the specter of alternative facts.
V. PRESUMPTIVE POLYVALENCE
A. Presumptions as Translation
In order to overcome the problem of presumptions, we must
begin with a functional analysis. How would the rule of law meet
its function to transcend community-based narrative given the
reality of incomplete information? This reality forecloses any call
for the abolition of presumptions. It also should caution against
412. FUKUYAMA, supra note 332, at 88.
413. Kazakhstan Has ‘Zero Tolerance’ Policy on Torture, Officials Tell European
Parliamentarians,
ASTANA
TIMES
(Apr.
17,
2018),
https://astanatimes.com/2018/04/kazakhstan-has-zero-tolerance-policy-on-tortureofficials-tell-european-parliamentarians/ [https://perma.cc/BUK2-3D9T]; In Dialogue
with Uzbekistan, Committee against Torture Experts Urge Effective Implementation of
Legislation and Further Investigations into Rights Violations, OHCHR (Nov. 13, 2019),
https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25294&Lan
gID=E [https://perma.cc/7FAA-AC4H]; Stephanie Nebehay, U.N. launches investigations
into
killings,
torture
in
Venezuela,
REUTERS
(Sept.
27,
2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-security-rights/u-n-launchesinvestigations-into-killings-torture-in-venezuela-idUSKBN1WC12H
[https://perma.cc/GDK4-GB72].
414. Caratube Int’l Oil Co. v. Kaz., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/12, award (May 30, 2012),
¶¶ 172-5.
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disfavoring presumptions. The reality is that global dispute
resolution bodies of any kind must act without a record that would
satisfy later generations of historians looking into the same
question.
Abolishing presumptions would return one to the technical
applications of burdens and standards of proof. The mechanical
use of burdens and standards of proof, as discussed already, is a
deeply unsatisfying solution.415 The resolution of disputes would
then depend purely upon the procedural posture of the case.416
This in turn would do little to raise confidence in the ability of
global dispute resolution processes fairly to resolve disputes. Or
differently put, a resolution premised in alternative facts is
preferable to a recognition of decisional impotence. In fact, it was
such decisional impotence which undergirded the “war paradigm”
of the colonialist period in international law: as all else fails, might
makes right.417 If might makes right, the instinct of NationalSocialist legal theorist Carl Schmitt becomes a self-fulling
prophecy: political struggle becomes mortal struggle.418
What is more, presumptions also are premised in an
appreciation of facts. One must prove that a presumption is
applicable. This means one must prove a predicate for the
presumption.419 Think again of proof of habit to stand in for proof
of conduct on a specific occasion.420 To benefit from an inference
from habit, one must first prove the habit in question. This
substitutes proof of one fact (conduct on a specific occasion) with
proof of another (habit).421
This means that presumptions are factually contestable.422 It
is always possible to poke holes in the proof of a habit. Likewise, it
is possible to prove that the habit does not cover what fact the
party means to prove by it. For example, a habit to put on a seat
belt does not prove that a person indicated their turn. Moreover, it
415. See Sections II.A.3 & II.B., supra.
416. See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
105 (rev. ed. 2011) (making a similar observation in a different context).
417. See HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 80-81.
418. SCHMITT, supra note 187, at 10.
419. See Section III.C.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 185
(1997).
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is possible to appreciate the habit in its richer factual context. This
means that presumptions have an important part to play to return
disputes about value to factually cognizable disagreements in the
first place.
At the same time, the current problem with presumptions is
that they do not always resolve disputes. Rather, as discussed in
the previous section, presumptions can import external narratives
into the dispute resolution process. These narratives can in turn
amplify the underlying dispute rather than resolving it—i.e., they
can shield the perpetrator of a wrong from liability by invoking its
narrative as a reason for decision as opposed to checking the
narrative against fact. This kind of narrative based decisionmaking is similarly problematic.
Returning to somewhat tautological first principles, the point
of global dispute resolution processes is to resolve disputes. In
order to resolve disputes, global dispute resolution processes must
rely upon presumptions in order to address the endemic
information deficit problem. At the same time, global dispute
resolution processes cannot resolve a dispute by merely
amplifying rather than testing the normative claims inherent in the
use of presumptions.
Dispute resolution ultimately requires an explanation by an
international court or tribunal why the losing party failed to
prevail.423 In the first place, this means that the losing party must
understand the reasoning of the international court or tribunal.424
Doctrinally, this merely requires that the parties can understand
the logic of the decision—whether or not they agree with its
basis.425
To resolve the dispute, as opposed to determining a winner in
a litigious contest, the decision must do more. Dispute resolution,
taken literally, is to find a new solution for the dispute that is to resolve its underlying problem. To achieve this, the losing party must
accept the result as legitimate.426 At a minimum, the dispute
423. R. DOAK BISHOP & SILVIA MARCHILI, ANNULMENT UNDER THE ICSID CONVENTION 15354 (2012).
424. Mar. Int’l Nominees Establishment v. Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4,
Decision on Annulment, ¶¶ 5.08-5.09 (Dec. 22, 1989).
425. Id.
426. See, e.g., CHENG, supra note 12, at 291; Casado v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2,
Annulment (Dec. 18, 2012), ¶ 266; Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4,
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resolution literature would demand respect for the autonomy of
the parties.427 Respecting autonomy in turn demands that the
parties be consulted in the decision-making process.428 This
consultation must be visible on the face of the decision itself.429 The
decisionmaker must provide an explanation that places the factual
claims of the prevailing party into the context of the losing party so
that the losing party can see that it was, in fact, heard rather than
merely given an opportunity to speak.430 It must explain the
decision in terms that the losing party would find authoritative.431
In theoretical terms, the international court or tribunal must
provide such an explanation without offending the dignity
interests of the losing party. Fukuyama recently theorized this
dignity interest in the context of identity politics driving narrativebased alternative-fact-focused political decision-making.432 In this
context, he theorized that the dignity could be split into two—a
demand for equal respect, which he linked to the Greek notion of
isothymia, and a demand for greater recognition premised upon
perceived merit, which he linked to the Greek notion of
megalothymia.433 Fukuyama submits that a key driver of current
identity-based politics is a claim by a growing number of groups
that the current paradigm of world order fails to satisfy their
demand for isothymia, thus creating an identity-based merits claim
that in turn falls into megalothymia.434 This disregard for equal
dignity becomes a vicious spiral by feeding demands premised in
megalothymia that in turn could destroy deliberative mechanisms
premised upon the equal dignity of discourse participants.435

Annulment (Jan. 28, 2002), ¶ 57; Fraport AG v. Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25,
Annulment (Dec. 23, 2010), ¶ 202.
427. ROGER FISHER & DANIEL SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASON 72-93 (2005).
428. Id. at 84.
429. See id. at 82-84.
430. See, e.g., CHENG, supra note 12, at 291; Casado v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2,
Annulment (Dec. 18, 2012), ¶ 266; Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4,
Annulment (Jan. 28, 2002), ¶ 57; Fraport AG v. Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25,
Annulment (Dec. 23, 2010), ¶ 202.
431. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, THE QUEST FOR WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS AND INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENT 81 (2012).
432. FUKUYAMA, supra note 332, 9-10, 21-22, 95, 140-144.
433. Id. at 21-22, 95.
434. Id. at 85, 95, 140-144.
435. Id.
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Isothymia has an immediate application in dispute resolution.
To reframe the discussion above slightly, the losing party must feel
that it was treated as an equal of its opponent in the resolution of
the dispute.436 A decision that offends the basic requirements of
equal treatment would denigrate the losing party by implying that
it is inherently not worthy of basic equal in treatment.437 Such
treatment would offend basic dignity interests and as such be
potentially illegitimate.438
International dispute resolution is conscious of this dignity
interest to isothymia. It requires that a court or tribunal treat the
parties with formal equality and substantive equality of arms.439
That means that the court’s or tribunal’s explanation why a party
failed to prevail cannot be one that ties a loss to status alone (e.g.,
one party is not a state and states are always right). 440 It must
provide non-status-based reasoning to support a factual
conclusion.441 Problematically, while conscious of this dignity
interest, the remedies available to protect it in dispute resolution
are highly limited, requiring close to a wanton disregard for the
equality of the parties by a tribunal.442 In the context of findings of
fact, these interests are notoriously under-enforced in the interest
of protecting the discretion of the finder of fact to weigh the
evidence.443

436. See, e.g., CHENG, supra note 12, at 291; Casado v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2,
Annulment (Dec. 18, 2012), ¶ 266; Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4,
Annulment (Jan. 28, 2002), ¶ 57; Fraport AG v. Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25,
Annulment (Dec. 23, 2010), ¶ 202.
437. See Thomas Wälde, “Equality of Arms” in Investment Arbitration, Procedural
Challenges, in ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS – A GUIDE TO KEY
ISSUES 161, 181 (Katia Yannaca-Small ed., 2010).
438. FUKUYAMA, supra note 332, at 9-10, 21-22.
439. MINE v. Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, Annulment (Dec. 22, 1989), ¶ 5.06;
CHENG, supra note 12, at 291; Casado v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2, at ¶ 266; Wena
Hotels Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, at ¶ 57; Fraport AG v. Phil., ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/25, at ¶ 202.
440. See Wälde, supra note 437, at 181.
441. MINE v. Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, Annulment (Dec. 22, 1989), ¶ 5.06;
CHENG, supra note 12, at 291; Casado v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2, at ¶ 266; Wena
Hotels Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, at ¶ 57; Fraport AG v. Phil., ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/25, at ¶ 202.
442. BISHOP & MARCHILI, supra note 423, at 132-35.
443. Alapli Elektrik BV v. Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/13, Annulment (July 10,
2014), ¶ 234; Tulip Real Estate Investment & Development BV v. Turk., ICSID Case No.
ARB/11/28, Annulment (Dec. 30, 2015), ¶ 150.
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Unfortunate, though, as this disconnect might appear at first
sight, it helps to open the door for a legal understanding of the
potential legitimacy deficit if presumptions are used “incorrectly.”
The legal toolkit available to the international lawyer shows that
as a legal matter, presumptions can be used incorrectly when a
court or tribunal uses them in a manner that fails to meet the
aspirations of isothymia. Yet, it also permits that this failure can
frequently fall beyond review. It sets up precisely the space in
which international legal decisions can be binding and beyond
review on the one hand and potentially illegitimate on the other.
How, then, does one use presumptions correctly? Thinking of
presumptions in terms of isothymia here is helpful. Presumptions
can make broader value claims standing behind them factually
intelligible and contestable. Presumptions do so when their
predicates are examined with care and inferences are narrowly
drawn. Such use of presumptions means that the value claims
standing behind presumptions are scrutinized in factual terms in
their own right. Isothymia demands as much—it requires one to
take seriously the value claims of those advancing a presumption
and those resisting it. Therefore, to prefer a value claim without
such scrutiny is to ignore the interests of the party against whom
the presumption is invoked.
Just as importantly, presumptions must be able to work and
be invoked both ways. A decisionmaker must hear the
presumptions that organize the same record evidence from all
perspectives. That is, it must render a factual picture that is
cognizant of the perspectives (literally) of both parties and make a
careful determination of how these perspectives overlap and
diverge–and how this overlap and divergence sheds light on the
value claims they each advance. Isothymia is only heeded when the
factual picture becomes complex; when we can see, in the words of
historian Christopher Clark, how each party could come to see
reality through its lens in a coherent manner and can engage with
that perspective on its own terms.444
So used, presumptions become tools to translate between the
various claims made by the parties. They can only do so by
embedding the use of presumptions in a rich factual context. In this
context, decisionmakers can understand how and why certain
444. CLARK, supra note 17, at 5.
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values are normatively salient. In this context too, however,
decisionmakers can also understand how and why certain values
shape the factual focus of our analysis and can expand their
perspective to take a fuller view of the facts by taking into account
the values and perspectives of the other disputing party.445
The analogy of translation is apt because there is no universal
language through which the court or tribunal could run this
translation.446 There is no universal narrative or precognitive bias
shared irrespective of lived experience. Or differently put, the
necessarily constructed nature of presumptions forecloses the use
of the “real world” as a tiebreaker. The need for presumption arises
precisely because there is insufficient information on what the real
world looks like. All there are, are puzzle pieces and competing
claims as to what the puzzle depicts.
The task of presumptions in this sense resembles that of
linguistic translation in a literal sense. Languages like few other
human constructs are embedded with crisscrossing layers of
cognitive narratives.447 Even between language communities with
longstanding historical contacts, there are terms that are near
untranslatable.448 English expressions such as “common sense”
find no direct analogue in French, a language from which English
borrowed heavily.449 “Bon sens”—a translation suggested for
example in Collins Dictionary comes close.450 But “sense” is not in
fact “common” but “good.” In fact, one French commentator
theorizing on appropriately “common sense” in French notes that
to accuse a person of such common sense (raison commune ou
sens common) is to put in doubt their intellectual acumen.451

445. I build just such a presumption in a different article. See Frédéric G. Sourgens,
The Precaution Presumption, 31 Eᴜʀ. J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ L. (forthcoming 2021).
446. GEORGE STEINER, AFTER BABEL 109-11 (3d ed. 1998).
447. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, in 1 WERKAUSGABE 225,
254 (Suhrkamp Verlag, 1984).
448. STEINER, supra note 446, at 382.
449. PHILIP DURKIN, A HISTORY OF LOANWORDS IN ENGLISH 171 (2014) (attesting to
heavy borrowing in English from French).
450. Common
Sense,
COLLINS
DICTIONARY,
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english-french/common-sense
[https://perma.cc/A8BN-66YR] (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
451. Oscar Brenifier, Le bon sense est-il commun?, DIOTOME (2007),
http://www.educ-revues.fr/DIOTIME/AffichageDocument.aspx?iddoc=32848
[https://perma.cc/ZTQ5-NZB2] (last visited Oct. 4, 2020). In a very French and somewhat
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“Common sense” in English has rather a less pejorative meaning: it
refers to “sound and prudent judgment based on a simple
perception of the situation or facts.”452
In reverse, “se débrouiller” is a French term for which there is
no ready English translation.453 To get by or to muddle through
might come close, but it does not capture the commonplace pride
associated with the original word. Similarly, Shakespeare’s
exuberance is nearly untranslatable into French despite the deep
historical ties between both countries and languages.454
Further, the task of translation cannot be accomplished
through recourse to a universal language.455 There is no common
denominator through which translation could function. Linguistic
translation, in other words, shares the problem we noted about
presumptions that there is no “real language” or “real world” that
could serve as a tiebreaker for meaningful expression.456
Particularly when dealing with highly complex, narrative-driven
expression, translation has to accomplish its task through holistic
comparison, case by case approximation, and experienced
reinvention of the underlying material.457
Importantly for the current context, the seemingly
insurmountable difficulties faced by translation have not stopped
it in its tracks. Literary translation flourishes, and authors such as
Shakespeare have deeply influenced foreign literary luminaries
such as Goethe despite the apparent chasms between their
linguistic home worlds.458 In turn, some of the best Nietzsche
scholars today hail from the English-speaking world despite the
fact that Nietzsche’s use of the German language is intimately

ironic sense, the author of the essay then proceeds to ground common sense by reference
to academic philosophical reasoning.
452. Common
Sense,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/common%20sense [https://perma.cc/64ZY-B9X2] (last visited
Oct. 4, 2020).
453. French Word of the Day: se débrouiller, THELOCAL.FR (Dec. 14, 2018),
https://www.thelocal.fr/20181214/french-word-of-the-day-se-dbrouiller
[https://perma.cc/Q7LX-RWFL].
454. STEINER, supra note 446, at 383-84.
455. Id. at 109-11.
456. Id.
457. See id. at 436.
458. NICHOLAS BOYLE, GOETHE, THE POET AND THE AGE 115-16 (1991).
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poetic.459 Fruitful communication, in other words, is possible
despite the underlying differences between the linguistic
experiences in different language communities.
Rather than presenting obstacles to communication, this
difference is an engine for creativity in both the source and the
target language. There would be no Shakespeare without the
Italian commedia del arte.460 There would be no German Urfaust
without Shakespeare.461 The imported perspective rejuvenated
the domestic idiom with new creative possibilities. The new
perspective also allows different insights into the source texts that
become visible only in translation. George Steiner’s masterful
analysis of the history of the reception of Sophocles’ Antigone is
one literary example of how translation discovers new meaning in
a paradigmatic masterpiece of Western literature.462 The American
translation of Italian humanist theory into constitutional action is
meaningfully additive to any reading of Machiavelli’s Discourses on
Livy.463 In a slightly less highbrow fashion, Matthew Pearl’s novel
“The Dante Club” shows the influence of the translation of Dante’s
inferno on the Holmes family (and on Oliver Wendell Holmes, later
Mr. Justice Holmes of the US Supreme Court).464
Given this experience of translation, it is possible to surmise
that a similar exercise might be possible in the task of conflict
resolution. Negotiation scholars drawing on the work in peace
talks suggest that a recontextualization of their respective
problems in light of shared experiences is a successful means of
communication between warring parties.465 The classical Getting
to Yes describes one of the tools available to this end as

459. See generally KEITH ANSELL PEARSON, VIROID LIFE, PERSPECTIVES ON NIETZSCHE AND
THE TRANSHUMAN CONDITION (1997); BRIAN LEITER, NIETZSCHE ON MORALITY (2002).
460. See Michele Marapodi, Introduction: Shakespeare’s Subversions, in SHAKESPEARE
AND THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE, APPROPRIATION, TRANSFORMATION, OPPOSITION 1-20 (Michele
Marapodi ed., 2014) (discussing the influence of Italy on Shakespeare’s writing).
461. BOYLE, supra note 458, at 143-44, 219 (discussing the influence of Shakespeare
on Götz von Berlichingen and the connection between Götz and Urfaust).
462. GEORGE STEINER, ANTIGONES, THE ANTIGONE MYTH IN WESTERN LITERATURE, ART,
AND THOUGHT 202-03 (1984).
463. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT, FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 509-52 (2d ed. 2003).
464. See generally MATTHEW PEARL, THE DANTE CLUB (2003).
465. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES, NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN 110-12 (3d ed. 2011).
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“negotiation jujitsu.”466 This jujitsu does not reject a position or
argument, but recasts it in light of the “interests behind it [and . . .
] the principles it reflects.”467 This negotiation jujitsu allows a
recontextualization of claims through translation by using the
interests and principles as a reference point.468 Getting to Yes
shows how this tactic worked in the context of the Egyptian-Israeli
conflict.469 It showed how demands made by Egypt’s Nasser could
be recast in a way that they would be unrealistic by reference to
Nasser’s own principles.470 This jujitsu provides a tested means to
translate that is not unlike linguistic contextual translation. This
insight therefore should and can underpin a reconceptualization of
presumptions to drive at the truth between the respective
narratives of the disputing parties.
If this project is successful, it again radiates beyond the
narrow confines of the technical rules governing international
dispute resolution. Rather, the rules governing factual finding in
international dispute resolution would highlight the importance of
the interstitial spaces between narratives making up the identitybased global policy discourses (be it theorized as a clash of
civilizations or a return to identity politics).471 There is narrative
and space between narratives. Dispute resolution would seek to
claim this space between narratives as a “neutral” ground in which
rule of law-based understandings of engagement can create shared
realities. This ground would be neutral not in the sense that it is
universal. Rather, it would be neutral in the sense that it is
contextually shared.
The point of this re-conception of presumptions is that we can
accept that there is no objective truth to which all claims or
narratives could be reduced and yet not give up the claim for
neutrality inherent in the liberal rule of law. Much as there is no
universal language, there is no universal reality. This does not stop
us from translating between realities.

466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.

Id.
Id. at 111.
See id.
Id. at 112.
Id.
See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE
REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996); FUKUYAMA, supra note 332.
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Or, from the point of view of the cultural historian, post-truth
discourses amplify our sense of the peculiar—of the intensely
cultural, or, as it has now become popular to say, intensely tribal
construction of reality through distinction. This understanding of
post-truth discourse merely reprises the juxtaposition of protoromantic notions of people, or Volk, and its unique genius on the
one hand and classical notions of rationality, or Verstand, and its
universality on the other.472 This juxtaposition is not new—Kant
and Herder died within a year of each other and represented much
of the same dichotomy.473 The moniker of post-truth in this sense
is merely the (pejorative) appraisal of romantic claims of identity
viewed through the lens of enlightenment rationalism. Rule of law
does not have to take sides in the opposition between peculiar and
universal; in fact, and ironically, it becomes the more powerfully
universal if it doesn’t.
Specifically, the rule of law project can still thrive in this
intensely peculiarized setting. Rather than focusing on a claim to
shared rationalist universality, rule of law becomes a call to
communication premised in translation. It would take at face value
that the lived experience of each construction of reality is equally
valuable and normatively valid. It would then seek to find
contextually constructed shared meanings between these lived
experiences. It would thus replace conceptions of international
order premised in might or premised in universal truth or
rationality with a conception of international order as premised in
translation and communicative action. It is in this sense that rule
of law as translation between realities would become more
diffusely universal and more universally relevant than its
rationalist counterpart: it is relevant whether or not one were to
ascribe to a universal, objective (physical and moral) reality. This
translative account of rule of law is particularly relevant in times
in which the diffusion of cultural realities is acutely felt in political
discourse. But it is no less relevant in times of relative calm as it
would even in those times remind dominant paradigms to be
mindful of the peculiar lived experiences of those to whom the rule
of law is applied.

472. See STEINER, supra note 462, at 81 (discussing Herder and Kant).
473. See Michael Forster, Johann Gottfried von Herder, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Aug.
25, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/herder/ [https://perma.cc/6V9U-QJ6X].
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B. Connotations and Presumptions
The theoretical foundations of presumptions permit a
conceptual recasting of presumptions that meets this functional
demand. Presumptions are ultimately rooted in the principle of
good faith. So far, the engagement with the principle of good faith
has asked how a party acts in good faith. That is, it gave the classic
doctrinal answer of good faith as honesty-in-fact and reasonable
conduct.
To achieve the necessary change in the conception of
presumptions, one must switch from the doctrinal how to the
jurisprudential why. What function does good faith serve? Why do
parties have to act honestly and reasonably?
The theoretical answer to this question is other regard.474 The
point of good faith is to change purely self-regarding conduct
towards cooperative conduct.475 Deals tend to work when the
parties can trust each other’s faithful performance; they tend to fail
in the face of constant self-dealing. Good faith mandates a
minimum of faithfulness in performance to support and protect the
viability of agreements. A switch from self-centered action to
cooperative conduct requires a change in perspective. It requires
one to regard or consider one’s counterparty, understanding its
motivations and goals, and to act in a manner that is consistent
with the newly formed joint enterprise.
This understanding of good faith has deep doctrinal roots. For
example, the law of treaties requires that parties perform treaties
in good faith.476 As the doctrinal literature explains, this means that
the text of a treaty cannot be read literally to achieve an
unexpected advantage.477 Rather, the treaty must be read in
accordance with its spirit or purpose.478 It thus must be read so as
to achieve the goals of the common enterprise rather than to
achieve self-gratification.479
474. See Frederic G. Sourgens, Reconstructing International Law as Common Law, 47
Geo. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 52-55 (2015); see also David Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129
HARV. L. REV. 885, 955 (2016).
475. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 504-07 (3d ed. 1999).
476. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
477. MARK VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES 367 (2009); RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 151 (2008).
478. See supra note 476.
479. Id.
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International and transnational law also recognize this duty
beyond the narrow confines of the performance of a treaty. Both
international and transnational law prohibit parties from abusing
their rights.480 The concept requires that when “the owner of a
right enjoys certain discretionary power” the power “must be
exercised reasonably, honestly, in conformity with the spirit of the
law and with due regard to the interests of others.”481
One can theorize that a determination of whether a party acts
in accordance with good faith requires a relative understanding of
their respective expectations and interests created by the
circumstances in which the parties find themselves as a whole.482
Good faith provides a means to translate the respective factual
demands by the parties to cooperative benefits into legally
cognizable claims. They do so in much the same way—if to a
potentially different degree—as “negotiation jujitsu” discussed in
the prior section: it asks the parties to apply the interests and
principles underlying their own factual demand and apply these
interests and principles to the position of counterparty to establish
whether the original demand is ultimately inconsistent with the
spirit of their agreement.483 If the interests and principles invoked
by the original demand can be defeated by a stronger factual case
when they are applied in reverse, the original demand is not made
with honest conviction as it tends to deny the counterparty the
cooperative benefit for which it bargained.484 The demanding
party thus would have to modify its demand to account for the
respective interests of its counterparty validated by the principles
and interests underlying the demanding party’s own claim.
This function-understanding of good faith allows for a
reconceptualization of presumptions. As presumptions are
premised in the principle of good faith, they must not just reflect
its specific doctrinal elements of honesty-in-fact and
reasonableness. Rather, they must fulfil the aspirations of good
480. Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pak. v. India), Judgment, 2000 I.C.J. 12, 30
(June 21); Phoenix Action Ltd. v. Czech, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award (Apr. 9, 2009),
¶¶ 93-95; Principle No. I.I.4, TRANS-LEX, https://www.trans-lex.org/906500
[https://perma.cc/X48Y-BUQK] (last visited on Sept. 7, 2020).
481. CHENG, supra note 12, at 133-34.
482. For a full discussion of this understanding of good faith, see Sourgens, supra
note 474, at 52-55.
483. FISHER & URY, supra note 465, at 110-12.
484. Id.
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faith as a translative tool to permit legally enforceable
communication between differently positioned actors.
The functional analysis of good faith itself permits a broader
diagnosis. Any dogmatic deployment of presumptions in violation
of principles of other regard and context-sensitive inquiry into the
relative points of view of the parties is inimical to the principle of
good faith. Such dogmatic use of presumptions would depend upon
self-regard, not other-regard. This is precisely what the doctrine of
good faith in international law and transnational law sought to
avoid. Rather than forcing parties to engage with their
counterparty and take the counterparties’ interests into account as
required by the principle of good faith, the law of presumptions
unwittingly picks the part of the doctrine of good faith that, in this
new context, has the opposite effect. To say that the law of
presumptions is premised in the principle of good faith therefore
must reject this type of invocation as misguided.
This means that it is necessary to re-think how presumptions
may be used in light of their source principle of good faith. The
point of good faith principles is that they require a matrix of
normative translation. Honesty in fact is a requirement to avoid
subterfuge and thus present a counterparty with a clear starting
position.485 Reasonableness, in turn, requires both parties to
communicate in a manner that is consistent with their community
expectations while being mindful of the reasonable reliance
interests of their counterparty.486 Good faith thus has multiple
access points that each can lead to valid arguments. It allows for
multiple ways in which it engage in discourses that are premised
in incommensurable narratives.
A way to express this point is to say that good faith, and thus
presumptions, have to make sense across different
connotations.487 The current understanding of good faith in
presumptions was doctrinally denotating and did not allow for this
linguistic nuance. It focused upon the narrative of the actor. Good
faith as a translative tool must focus on the narrative of the actor,
the counterparty, and those affected by the decision.488 Thus, good
faith is no longer fixed in some objective denotation—nor depends,
485.
486.
487.
488.

FARNSWORTH, supra note 475, at 504-07.
Id.
See Sourgens, supra note 474, at 36-37.
Id.
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for the validity of its argument, on a single discourse or narrative.
It must be cognizant of connotations or open to acting in multiple
narratives at the same time.
C. Deploying Translating Presumptions
The theoretical reconfiguration of presumptions as truly
translative tools premised in the principle of good faith is only
more than a fancy string of paronyms if it can actually be deployed.
It is therefore important to provide a blueprint for the actual use
of translating presumptions. This blueprint in many instances will
lead to results that approximate current practice—that is they will
not alter the result reached by the International Court of Justice in
Corfu Channel or the investor-state tribunal in Kim v. Uzbekistan.
Yet, in some instances, it will indeed change the fact-finding
process in outcome-determinative ways.
The starting point for the adaptation of translating
presumptions is to use the toolkit that is already on display in the
practice of presumptions. Thus, the practice of presumptions
always contrasts the assumptions held by the actor (the Albanian
state in Corfu Channel, the corporate investor in Kim) with the
assumptions held by the counterparty (the British navy in Corfu
Channel, the Uzbek anti-corruption officials in Kim).489 The practice
of presumptions, therefore, is already mindful of the duality of
perspectives at play in fact finding.
The problem so far is that this duality of perspective leads us
straight back to the narrative problem discussed in the previous
section; decision is premised in the assumptions and aspirations of
one party to the exclusion of the other. 490 Such a decision lacks
legitimacy in the eye of the losing party because its choice of
premise will simply be unacceptable to the losing party in most
instances. Additional perspectives are needed to overcome this
problem.
When good faith encounters this problem in other contexts, it
typically looks to a reasonableness of reliance interests as its

489. Corfu Channel, Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 16-18 (Apr. 9); Kim v. Republic of Uzb.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/13/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 546-87 (Mar. 8, 2017).
490. See supra Part IV.B.
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guide.491 Could one party understand that its own actions would
have an effect on a party that approaches those actions from a
different vantage point? Classically, this reliance understanding of
good faith developed in international law in the context of the law
of unilateral acts or unilateral declarations.492 Though its doctrinal
underpinnings are technical, its overall gist is deeply intuitive in
practice. Unilateral declarations create international legal
obligations for the declarant to the extent that the declaration
would reasonably lead the intended audience to believe that it may
rely on the actor’s representations.493 The mechanism is one of
reasonable reliance closely related to doctrines of estoppel.
The classical case for the articulation of unilateral acts are the
Nuclear Tests cases brought by Australia and New Zealand against
France.494 The core issue in the Nuclear Tests was whether France
was legally entitled to conduct atmospheric nuclear weapons tests
in the South Pacific. The International Court of Justice did not reach
that question.495 Rather, it focused on a different aspect of the case
that the parties had not fully developed: the President of France
had made public statements that France would halt atmospheric
nuclear weapons tests.496 The International Court of Justice
determined that this statement by the head of state created
reasonable reliance interests in the world community that France
would indeed halt its test program.497 In light of the circumstances
of the case, the Court did not require proof of actual reliance so long
as the reliance was in fact reasonable. 498

491. See Frederic G. Sourgens, Supernational Law, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 155, 18495 (2017).
492. See Duncan B. Hollis & Joshua J. Newcomer, ‘‘Political” Commitments and the
Constitution, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 507, 525 (2009).
493. For a full discussion of unilateral acts, see Frédéric G. Sourgens, Keep the Faith:
Investment Protection Following the Denunciation of International Investment Agreements,
11 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 335, 383-87 (2013).
494. See generally Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20).
495. Sir Arthur Watts, Nuclear Tests Cases, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public
International
Law
(Jan.
2007),
https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law9780199231690-e185 [https://perma.cc/P9B5-46RZ].
496. Brigitte Bollecker-Stern, L’affaire des Essais nucléaires français devant la Cour
internationale de justice, 20 Aɴɴᴜᴀɪʀᴇ Fʀᴀɴᴄ̧ ᴀɪs ᴅᴇ Dʀᴏɪᴛ Iɴᴛ’ʟ 299, 330 (1974).
497. Id.
498. Id.
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To analogize the situation to domestic law, the law of
unilateral acts thus resembles principles of promissory estoppel at
work in the context of charitable subscriptions.499 Promissory
estoppel canonically requires that both the actor knew that its
actions would reasonably induce reliance and actual reliance
occurred.500 In the context of a charitable subscription, promissory
estoppel drops the requirement of actual reliance.501 The reason
for this lesser requirement in the context of charitable
subscriptions is in part grounded in the difficulty in proving actual
reliance in the cases in point—that is, they are not the kind of
actions that would readily bring about a change in action by the
receiving party but have value to that party nonetheless.502 This
rationale is reasonably similar to the unilateral act scenario: how
would the world community rely to its detriment upon a
representation that France would halt its atmospheric nuclear
weapons testing? In particular, how would a non-nuclear weapons
state rely on that statement? Reliance will be a very difficult matter
to prove.
This understanding of good faith can be applied to
presumptions by adding two considerations. First, it must be
known how each party perceived the conduct of the counter-party
as part of its respective external narrative. Second, it must be
understood whether the conduct gave rise to reasonable reliance
interests. Should each actor itself have a reasonable understanding
that its conduct would be understood by the counterparty in a
certain way?
Importantly, this understanding weaved its way into the
analysis in Corfu Channel and in Kim v. Uzbekistan, if as an
overdetermined reason for a presumption that already been
established on other grounds. In Corfu Channel, the Court noted the
engagement between the Albanian forces and the British navy
when British vessels were in the straights in question on prior
occasions.503 This engagement implicitly supports reasonable
499. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
500. Id. at§ 90(1).
501. Id. at §90(2).
502. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 475, at 91-101.
503. Corfu Channel, Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 19 (Apr. 9) (“This vigilance sometimes
went so far as to involve the use of force : for esample the gunfire in the direction of the
British cruisers Orion and Sztperb on May 15th 1, 946, and the shots fired at the U.N.R.R.A.
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reliance interests: that is, it is reasonable for the British navy to
believe that no military vessels would be in the straights
unobserved. This is precisely the presumption from which the UK
benefited in the case—but justified by reference not to the UK’s
narrative alone.504 It can now be translated in Albania’s narrative
by contextualizing the UK narrative in the context of Albania’s own
actions and rationale.
The Kim v. Uzbekistan tribunal similarly spent significant time
to anchor its decision in a detailed exposition of Uzbek law.505 The
presumption in favor of Kim was not only appropriate as a matter
of international practice.506 It was in fact appropriate because the
Uzbek law was itself not satisfied by the arguments raised by
Uzbekistan.507 Uzbekistan’s arguments were thus not dismissed
simply by virtue of the narrative of the Kim investors. 508 They were
rejected because the Kim investor narrative was contextualized in
the context of Uzbekistan town laws and actions.509
Finally, the presumption matrix developed on the basis of the
principle that good faith should not be blind to the interests of third
parties in the outcome of the litigation. Again, the relevant estoppel
analysis would support the view that reasonable reliance by third
parties is sufficient to create an estoppel.510 This should apply by
analogy in the context of presumptions. The factual findings made
by international courts and tribunals have significant downstream
effects by creating a foundation for future legal relations between
non-parties. They thus affect more than the parties. The use of
presumptions should not be blind to this concern.
Again, the Corfu Channel case demonstrates that this concern
is already implicit in the use of presumptions when presumptions
are used well. Thus, the impact of the judgment of the Court on
tug and barges on October 29th, 1946, as established by the affidavit of Enrico Bargellini,
which was not seriously contested.”).
504. See id. (“As the Parties agree that the minefield had been recently laid, it must
be concluded that the operation was carried out during the period of close watch by the
Albanian authorities in this sector. This conclusion renders the Albanian Government's
assertion of ignorance a priori somewhat improbable.”).
505. Kim v. Republic of Uzb., ICSID Case No. ARB/13/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶
546-87 (Mar. 8, 2017).
506. Id. at ¶ 546.
507. Id. at ¶ 587.
508. Id.
509. Id.
510. FARNSWORTH, supra note 475, at 100-01.

2020]

TRUTHS IN TRANSLATION

183

Yugoslavia was one of the motivating factors in the use of
presumptions.511 Yugoslavia was not a party to the proceedings.
The Court therefore had to tread carefully in making factual
findings that would negatively impact Yugoslavia’s rights and
interests. The use of presumptions allowed the Court to do this by
avoiding the question who mined the straights.
The change in perspective will have a marked impact on other
cases. The Article began with a discussion of the Pulp Mills case
between Argentina and Uruguay.512 That case may well have been
decided differently in the context of the translative approach to
presumptions. As discussed above, the Court in Pulp Mills decided
that there was no evidence on the basis of which a violation of the
underlying environmental obligations incurred by Uruguay for
building pulp mills on the banks of the river could have been
established.513 But the Pulp Mills Court also found that Uruguay
failed to live up to its procedural obligations to consult with regard
to new projects on the river.514 This failure to communicate is itself
a tell. It makes it reasonable for Argentina to conclude that it would
have had grounds to object had it been meaningfully consulted.
Thus, here we have a case in which Argentina was deprived of the
procedural opportunity to communicate and consult, and then lost
the ensuing litigation on the basis of Uruguay’s narrative. The
matrix developed in this Article makes this result reasonably
suspect. It makes it more supect considering the impact of the
Court’s conclusions will be felt by people, flora and fauna on the
river—parties who were intended beneficiaries of the underlying
treaty, but not parties before the Court. A change in our approach
to presumptions thus is not a distinction without a difference but a
means to make international justice significantly more responsive
to the expectations of the global community in the rule of law.
Even as the deployment of polyvalent presumption can
change the outcome of cases, it is important to note what they do
not do. We still are no closer to finding out what actually happened.
The use of presumptions does not avoid the need to construct
reality in order to do material justice. Or differently put, historians
studying archival and archeological evidence in the distant future
511.
512.
513.
514.

Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 16-17.
Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 15.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 70.
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may very well come to radically different conclusions as to what
actually occurred than the adjudicative processes.
Again, the Corfu Channel case is telling. Recent archival
evidence together with archeological evidence suggests that the
British entered the straights with an intent to provoke a skirmish
with Albanian forces.515 Albania had apparently anticipated such a
potential move by the British on the basis of the unsanctioned
removal of mines by British warships from Albanian waters.516 In
response, Albania communicated with Yugoslavia to seek out a
common defense policy for the area premised upon Yugoslav
mining the straights.517 A communique sent by Albania to
Yugoslavia after the British vessels hit mines stated that “[t]he
warship that hit a mine within the zone mined by us bore the
number RE 62.”518 In other words, the International Court of
Justice was historically wrong on key factual questions before it
which it resolved on the basis of presumptions: British passage
was not innocent,519 and Albania had, in fact, colluded with
Yugoslavia.520
The translative use of presumptions thus has a different goal
from finding out historical fact. Such a search would fail to resolve
sensitive disputes when they occur (i.e., it does us little good today
to resolve the Corfu Channel dispute by pacific means). The point
rather is that the ultimate decision should be made in a manner
that creates a means for engagement and dispute resolution
between the narratives created by the parties. The rule of law does
not impose material justice from an external, objective, fixed
source. It anchors material justice in the expectations of
participants in transnational legal processes. It does not create a
narrative of its own. It provides a bridge for us to understand the
narratives of others and making decisions from this new,
communicative vantage point.

515. See Ana Lalaj, Burning Secrets of the Corfu Channel Incident 14 (Woodrow Wilson
Int’l
Ctr.
for
Scholars,
Working
Paper
No.
70,
2014),
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/cwihp_wp_70_burning_secrets_of_the
_corfu_channel_incident.pdf [https://perma.cc/65U5-ZLXY].
516. Id. at 8, 19-21.
517. Id. at 19-21.
518. Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
519. Id. at 14.
520. Id. at 21.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Article highlighted the important role of presumptions in
international dispute resolution. It critiqued that the current
doctrinal use of presumptions runs into an important is-ought
problem: it assumes that things are as they ought to be. Moreover,
it borrows how things ought to be from the self-regulatory
horizons of the actors whose conduct is at issue in disputes at bar.
This creates significant problems for fact finding in international
dispute resolution as it premises fact finding in narratives and
normative claims rather than empirical fact. It is subject to the
charge of peddling in alternative facts.
The Article suggested that this problem might well be
overcome if the focus of presumptions is not on the actor’s conduct,
but rather focused on the relationship between actor and the
community acted upon. It suggested that this perspective could be
anchored in the principle of good faith as other regard. This good
faith as other regard could translate the claims brought forward by
actors and acted upon into the normative framework of the
respective other. It thus presented a bridge through which fact
finding could always be anchored in the horizon of all affected
parties by dispute resolution.
This focus upon presumptions anchored in effects of action as
communication allows us to make a broader observation. This
broader observation is that the mechanism of fact finding through
other regard allows us to deal with narrative without need for a tie
breaker in an objectively testable, empirical world. It thus allows
us to deal with a discourse that is increasingly premised in battling
alternative facts and claims to value or respect. Rather than
proving one side right by reference to the world, it flips the script
and anchors decision and engagement in the principles and values
of the respective “other” party opponent. This focus is anchored in,
and has been tested by, strategies of alternative dispute resolution.
The key benefit of such a strategy is that international dispute
resolution—and fact finding in international dispute resolution—
can again fulfil the role of pacific dispute resolution. It can serve as
a means both to diffuse and to translate claims made in the idiom
of alternative facts. It can understand these alternative facts on the
basis of the actions that brought them about and the effective
assertion of alternative facts imprinted in the world. By translating
these alternatives facts, and anchoring decision in a language that
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is sensitive to its underlying claims to dignity, dispute resolution
will be respectful to the underlying claims to equal regard and
equal value that fuels recourse to alternative facts in the first
place.521 Thus, it again can serve as the means of de-escalation that
its original authors in the Hague in 1899 had hoped it could
become.522

521. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 332, at 140-44.
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